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This Article examines the immediate effects on free expression of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s 2015 ruling in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc. involving the government speech doctrine. In Walker, a sharply—and largely
partisanly—divided Court upheld, in the face of a First Amendment challenge,
Texas’s decision denying a private organization’s application for a specialty license
plate featuring Confederate battle flag imagery. This Article initially reviews the
government speech doctrine and Walker. It then analyzes Walker’s impact on cases
that, like it, involve specialty license plate programs. Next, this Article explores lower
court efforts stretching Walker’s test for government speech to four very different
settings: 1) a public school program that allows banners promoting private busi-
nesses to hang on school fences in exchange for monetary donations to the school;
2) highway welcome centers and rest areas offering tourist-oriented literature and
advertisements published by private entities; 3) an outdoor lunch program held on
public property featuring private food-truck vendors; and 4) the process of federal
trademark registration for allegedly disparaging names. Finally, this Article synthe-
sizes the lower courts’ analyses in these diverse scenarios, identifying both themes
and problems with the doctrine in a post-Walker world.
INTRODUCTION
There may be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a
government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a
forum for private speech[.]1
* Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the
Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.
BA, Communication, Stanford University, 1987; JD (Order of the Coif), McGeorge School
of Law, University of the Pacific, 1991; PhD, Communication, Stanford University, 1996.
Member, State Bar of California. The author thanks graduate students Minch Minchin and
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of Florida, for their research and editing assistance with several drafts of this Article.
1 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
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In 2015, a sharply divided United States Supreme Court provided stark proof
of the epigraph above when it held in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc.2 that Texas’s specialty license plates constitute government speech
rather than private expression.3 That conclusion, in turn, led the majority to find that
the Lone Star State did not violate the First Amendment4 speech rights of the Sons
of Confederate Veterans (SCV) when it denied that organization’s request for a spe-
cialty plate featuring the image of a Confederate battle flag.5
Application of the government speech doctrine is critical in rendering nugatory
First Amendment claims like those of the SCV. That is because, as Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky points out, “when the government is the speaker, the First Amendment
does not apply at all or provide a basis for challenging the government’s action.”6
Indeed, Justice Stephen Breyer explained for the five-Justice Walker majority7
that “[w]hen government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from
determining the content of what it says.”8 The distinction between government
speech and private expression, the latter of which is subject to the full panoply of
First Amendment safeguards, thus “is often of substantial importance from the per-
spective of free speech law.”9
Walker’s outcome banning Confederate battle flags on license plates surely was
emotionally satisfying for many people.10 As Chemerinsky explains, “[i]t is easy to
like the result in this case because [C]onfederate battle flags convey a message of
2 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
3 Id. at 2253.
4 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press[.]” U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than ninety
years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties
to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
5 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2253; see also id. at 2245 (noting that part of the design included
the SCV’s “logo, a square Confederate battle flag framed by the words ‘Sons of Confederate
Veterans 1896.’ A faint Confederate battle flag appeared in the background on the lower por-
tion of the plate.”).
6 Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 730 (2011) (foot-
note omitted).
7 Breyer was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia
Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2243. Justice Samuel Alito penned a dis-
sent that was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony
Kennedy. Id at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 2245 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009)).
9 R. George Wright, Managing the Distinction Between Government Speech and Private
Party Speech, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 347, 347 (2016).
10 See, e.g., Editorial, Government Speech: A Sensible Court Ruling on Confederate Flag
Plates, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, June 22, 2015, at A-6 (calling the ruling in Walker a “welcome
decision,” asserting that “the high court ruled sensibly,” and opining that “the Confederate
flag for too many Americans has been a symbol of terrorism and racial oppression”).
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racism that is inherently hurtful and divisive.”11 Although everyone may not agree
with Chemerinsky’s contention, “polls have indicated that most African Americans
view the Confederate battle flag as racist and emblematic of 19th century efforts to
preserve slavery as well as 20th century efforts to maintain a segregated South.”12
In Walker, although the SCV claimed its proposed plate was “merely honoring those
who fought for the South during the Civil War,”13 Texas denied the application
precisely because it found the flag “offensive.”14
Yet Chemerinsky, from a macro-level perspective stretching beyond the specific
facts of Walker, is displeased with the majority’s approach to government speech—
so much so he confesses “I don’t get to say this often, but . . . I think that the con-
servative Justices—Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy and Alito—got it right” in their
Walker dissent.15 Specifically, the liberal-leaning Chemerinsky16 asserts:
[T]here is much that is troubling about the [C]ourt’s approach.
If license plates are government speech, and the government can
say whatever it wants, does this mean the government can put any
message it wants on license plates and require that people have
that on their cars? What if the government wants to put a message
that abortion is murder or a message to vote Republican? The
[C]ourt’s approach says that when the government is the speaker,
it cannot be challenged for violating the speech clause of the
First Amendment.17
He adds that “the [C]ourt’s approach gives the government the ability to avoid free
speech challenges by declaring that something is government speech. Could a city
11 Erwin Chemerinsky, Free Speech, Confederate Flags and License Plates, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (June 25, 2015, 3:57 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/government
-668320-texas-license.html [https://perma.cc/VQ78-DVGW].
12 Gerald R. Webster & Jonathan I. Leib, Whose South Is It Anyway? Race and the
Confederate Battle Flag in South Carolina, 20 POL. GEOGRAPHY 271, 275 (2001).
13 Richard Wolf & Brad Heath, Justices Split Rulings on Free Speech: Supreme Court
OK with Restricting License Plates but Frowns on Treating Roadside Signs Differently
Based on Content, USA TODAY, June 19, 2015, at 3A.
14 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Upholds Texas Ban of License Plates with Confederate
Flag, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2015, at A12.
15 Chemerinsky, supra note 11.
16 See Sonya Geis, Scholars Decry Law School’s About-Face on New Dean, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 2007, at A02 (describing Chemerinsky as a “highly visible liberal law professor” and
noting that “[h]e is a frequent guest on talk shows to represent a liberal point of view”); Adam
Liptak, Furor Ends in Deanship for Liberal Scholar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at A18
(labeling Chemerinsky “a liberal law professor” and observing that “Chemerinsky has for
decades been a prominent liberal public intellectual and litigator, and he has written scores
of opinion articles taking liberal positions”).
17 Chemerinsky, supra note 11.
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library choose to have only books by Republican authors by saying that it is the
government speaking?”18
This Article examines the immediate ramifications of Walker, particularly in
light of Chemerinsky’s fears regarding possible fallout in pro-conservative-view
fashion.19 Part I initially reviews the government speech doctrine and the Court’s
decision in Walker, including the logic and reasoning applied by both the majority
and dissent.20 Part II then explores Walker’s immediate impact on cases21 involving
specialty license plate policies in states other than Texas.22 Next, Part III analyzes
a quartet of lower-court decisions post-Walker23 involving efforts by government
entities to apply the government speech doctrine to scenarios and venues other than
specialty license plate programs.24 The Conclusion identifies some lessons and
problems illustrated by the post-Walker rulings regarding the application and scope
of the government speech doctrine.25
Ultimately, the Article asserts that while Walker’s result holds visceral appeal
for those who abhor Confederate battle flag symbolism, the Court’s logic and rea-
soning in reaching that outcome leave much to be desired—a fact demonstrated by
the half-dozen post-Walker rulings (two specialty license plate cases, four involving
other situations) examined here. The three-factor approach to government speech
proffered by the Walker majority,26 along with a different three-prong test proposed by
18 Id.
19 Chemerinsky’s worries about pro–Republican speech decisions being supported by
Walker’s reasoning, of course, likely stem from his liberal leanings. See Robert Barnes, Will
Conservatives Save Obamacare?, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2012, at B1 (describing Chemerinsky
as “the liberal dean of the University of California at Irvine Law School” (emphasis added)).
The opposite, however, could also prove true: Walker’s reasoning might be used by the gov-
ernment in heavily Democratic-leaning states, such as California, to espouse liberal points
of view and to suppress conservative ones. This Article thus uses Chemerinsky’s frets simply
to demonstrate potential problems of viewpoint-based discrimination after Walker as recog-
nized by a leading constitutional scholar; it abstains from adopting a political position.
20 See infra Part I.
21 The cases examined in Part II are American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina
v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2016) and Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.
Holcomb, No. 7:99-cv-00530, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103603 (W.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2015).
22 See infra Part II.
23 The four cases examined in Part III are Mech v. School Board of Palm Beach County,
806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016); In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321
(Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 13 S. Ct. 30 (2016); Wandering Dago,
Inc. v. Destito, No. 1:13-cv-01053, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2016),
appeal filed sub nom. Wandering Dago Inc. v. New York State Office of General Services,
No. 16-622 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2016); Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Virginia Department of Transpor-
tation, 171 F. Supp. 3d 457 (E.D. Va.), appeal filed, No. 16-1404 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016).
24 See infra Part III.
25 Infra notes 382–469 and accompanying text.
26 See infra Section I.B.1 (describing Justice Breyer’s articulation of the three-part test
for the majority in Walker).
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the dissent,27 both foster large degrees of malleability and plasticity that permit the
government to censor speech it finds offensive or detrimental to its interests. In brief,
and when viewed most critically, Walker and its progeny illustrate a key difference
in First Amendment law between a results-oriented jurisprudence (one that feels
good about shutting down images of the Confederate battle flag in a particular case)
and a doctrinally coherent jurisprudence (one that balances First Amendment speech
interests against government needs in a logical, predictable, and consistent manner).
I. GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND THE WALKER RULING:
A MUDDLED DOCTRINE GROWS MURKIER
This Part has two sections. The first provides an overview of the government
speech doctrine and its important, yet unsettled and contested, nature. The second
section then analyzes the Walker ruling.
A. Overview and Importance of the Government Speech Doctrine
The government speech doctrine is a powerful weapon in a state’s arsenal for
expression—one deployable both for promoting the government’s own viewpoint
and, conversely, for squelching the views of others with which it disagrees.28 As
Professor Joseph Blocher explains, the “doctrine gives the government a nearly
unlimited power not only to flood the market with its own viewpoints, but to limit
private speakers on the basis of theirs.”29
In Walker, for instance, the private speaker limited was the Texas Division of
the SCV.30 Specifically, Texas denied the SCV the ability to express its viewpoint
on specialty license plates.31
This pro-censorial outcome comports with Professor David Ardia’s prescient,
pre-Walker observation that “[t]he government speech doctrine . . . grants the
government nearly carte blanche ability to exclude speakers and speech on the basis
of viewpoint so long as the government can show that it ‘effectively controlled’ the
message being conveyed.”32 Indeed, as Professor John Inazu notes, characterizing
27 See infra Section I.B.2 (describing Justice Alito’s articulation of the three-part test for
the minority in Walker).
28 Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695,
767 (2011).
29 Id.
30 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243–44 (2015).
31 Id. at 2245.
32 David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums: First Amendment Limitations
on Moderating Public Discourse on Government Websites, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1981, 1983–84
(footnote omitted).
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speech as that of the government allows lawmakers to “impose content or even
viewpoint-based expressive restrictions.”33
Typically, such viewpoint-based discrimination by the government is “dis-
favorable.”34 Professor Martin Redish explains that “[i]f there is one unbending
principle of First Amendment theory and doctrine, it is that government may not
shut off one side of a political debate because of disagreement with the position
sought to be expressed.”35
The rule against viewpoint-based censorship, however, does not apply when
courts consider the government—rather than a private individual or entity—to be
the speaker.36 As Professor Blocher asserts, “when the government speaks, it can say
what it wants, even if that means discriminating on the basis of viewpoint.”37
Thus, because the Walker majority identified Texas as the speaker on specialty
license plates, the Lone Star State could freely stifle imagery of the Confederate
battle flag simply because it objected to the viewpoint or message the flag allegedly
conveys.38 In brief, when the government speaks, its decisions about what to say and
what to censor are “not subject to First Amendment review.”39 The government, in
other words, gets a free pass from First Amendment strictures.
A critical problem, however, with the government speech doctrine is, as Profes-
sor Mark Strasser wrote several years prior to the Court’s Walker ruling, that “there
are no clear criteria by which to determine when the government is speaking or
what, if anything, the govern-ment [sic] must say to trigger the doctrine’s pro-
tections.”40 Strasser added that “this lack of clarity has caused great confusion in the
lower courts—judges seem not to know how or when to apply the doctrine.”41
33 John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s Public Forum, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159,
1182 (2015).
34 See Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2014) (“The First Amendment, our
precedent makes plain, disfavors viewpoint-based discrimination.” (citing Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995))).
35 Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 579–80 (1997)
(footnote omitted).
36 See Barry P. McDonald, The Emerging Oversimplifications of the Government Speech
Doctrine: From Substantive Content to a “Jurisprudence of Labels,” 2010 BYU L. REV.
2071, 2071 (noting that, under the government speech doctrine, the Supreme Court permits
“the imposition of normally prohibited viewpoint restrictions on private speakers”).
37 Joseph Blocher, New Problems for Subsidized Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083,
1096 (2015) (footnotes omitted).
38 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253
(2015).
39 Inazu, supra note 33, at 1166 (footnote omitted).
40 Mark Strasser, Ignore the Man Behind the Curtain: On the Government Speech
Doctrine and What It Licenses, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85, 85 (2011).
41 Id.
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Professors Helen Norton and Danielle Keats Citron identified the same problem in
2010, writing that “the Supreme Court has yet to articulate a clear rule for parsing
government from private speech[.]”42 Indeed, Professor Lyrissa Lidsky averred in
2012 that the government speech doctrine is “lacking in coherence—to put it mildly.”43
In a nutshell, the government speech doctrine prior to 2015 was in a tumultuous
state of judicial fermentation.
B. Wading into Walker
It was against this unstable, if not volatile, background that the U.S. Supreme
Court waded into Walker and put Texas’s specialty license plate program directly
in the Court’s crosshairs. Under that program, all specialty plates featured “the word
‘Texas,’ a license plate number, and one of a selection of designs prepared by the
State.”44 Non-profit entities, including the SCV, can apply for a specialty plate
featuring their own design.45 The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board, how-
ever, wields statutory power to reject a proposed plate “if the design might be
offensive to any member of the public[.]”46
In addition to incorporating “Texas” and a license plate number, the SCV’s pro-
posed plate included “the organization’s logo, a square Confederate battle flag
framed by the words ‘Sons of Confederate Veterans 1896,’” as well as “[a] faint
Confederate battle flag [that] appeared in the background on the lower portion of the
plate.”47 After seeking public comment on this design, the Board rejected it because
“‘many members of the general public find the design offensive, and because such
comments are reasonable.’”48 Indeed, according to the Austin American-Statesman,
“[o]pponents of a proposed Confederate flag license plate in Texas presented peti-
tions containing 22,000 signatures” to Texas’s Department of Motor Vehicles in
October 2011.49 The SCV sued in response, seeking a court order, premised on First
Amendment grounds, requiring the Board to issue its proposed plate.50
As framed by Justice Stephen Breyer for the majority, the issue was whether the
Board’s decision rejecting the SCV’s specialty plate “violated the Constitution’s free
42 Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
899, 917 (2010).
43 Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1976 (2011) (footnote omitted).
44 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2244 (2015)
(citations omitted).
45 Id.
46 TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 504.801(c) (West 2015).
47 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245.
48 Id. (citation omitted).
49 Mike Ward, Confederate Flag Plates Draped in Strife, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Oct. 13, 2011, at B01.
50 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245.
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speech guarantees.”51 The resolution of that issue, in turn, hinged directly on whether
specialty plates in Texas are government speech or private expression.
That “distinction is critical,”52 Samuel Alito explained for the four-Justice dis-
sent, because the First Amendment does not apply to government speech and the
government thus can choose and favor whatever views it wants.53 In stark contrast,
the government “cannot forbid private speech based on its viewpoint.”54
Ultimately, the Walker majority—a block of four liberal-leaning Justices joined
by stalwart conservative Clarence Thomas55—concluded “that Texas’s specialty
license plate designs constitute government speech and that Texas was consequently
entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring SCV’s proposed design.”56 Conversely,
the dissent, comprised of four conservative-tilting Justices,57 held that “[m]essages
that are proposed by private parties and placed on Texas specialty plates are private
speech, not government speech”58 and that Texas therefore violated the First
Amendment speech rights of the SCV by discriminating against the organization’s
viewpoint.59 The dissent found that Texas’s specialty plate program amounted to “a
limited public forum” in which the government “cannot discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint.”60
How did the Justices reach these conflicting conclusions? As described later,
both the majority and dissent applied three-part tests they claimed were drawn from
51 Id. at 2244.
52 Id. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 2255.
54 Id. at 2263.
55 Authored by Stephen Breyer, the majority opinion was joined by Justices Clarence
Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Id. at 2243 (majority
opinion); see also Robert Barnes, Texas Free to Say No to Confederate Flag Plates, WASH.
POST, June 19, 2015, at A1 (noting that “Justice Clarence Thomas, the court’s only African
American justice, split with fellow conservatives and joined the court’s liberals in the 5-to-4
decision”); Adam Liptak, Right Divided, Disciplined Left Steered Justices, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2015, at A1 (observing that “[t]he liberals, as usual, voted as a group—but they were joined
by Justice Thomas in a rare alliance”); David G. Savage, Court Upholds License Plate Limits,
L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2015, at A8 (reporting that Thomas “cast a rare fifth vote on the side
of the court’s four liberals to reject the Confederate license plate”).
Some speculated that Thomas, an African American and arguably “the Court’s staunchest
conservative,” might have joined the four liberals because of his personal “experience with
symbols of hate and violence[.]” Dahlia Lithwick, Good Day to Fold Up the Confederate
Flag, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, June 22, 2015, at A-7.
56 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2253.
57 Samuel Alito authored the dissent and was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, and
Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy. Id. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 2263.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 2262 (citations omitted).
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the Court’s 2009 ruling in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.61 In Summum, the Court
held that “the placement of a permanent monument in a public park is best viewed
as a form of government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the
Free Speech Clause.”62 Summum involved a religious group’s efforts to force a Utah
municipality “to place a permanent monument in a city park in which other donated
monuments were previously erected.”63 Specifically, a church named Summum
sought to donate a stone monument featuring its “Seven Aphorisms” and to have it
placed in Pioneer Park in Pleasant Grove City, Utah.64
Writing the Court’s opinion in Summum and holding that permanent monuments
in the park constitute government speech, Justice Alito reasoned, among other
things, that “[g]overnments have long used monuments to speak to the public.”65 He
added that “throughout our Nation’s history,” governments have exercised “selective
receptivity” when choosing to accept or reject privately donated monuments.66 Such
governmental selectivity is necessary, in part, due to physical space restrictions. As
Alito wrote, “public parks can accommodate only a limited number of permanent
monuments.”67 Emphasizing what might be considered a spatial-scarcity factor, Alito
added that “it is hard to imagine how a public park could be opened up for the in-
stallation of permanent monuments by every person or group wishing to engage in
that form of expression.”68
In addition to considering factors of history, selectivity, and spatial-scarcity when
evaluating whether permanent monuments in public parks constitute government
speech, Justice Alito focused on public perception. Specifically, he noted that
“[p]ublic parks are often closely identified in the public mind with the government
unit that owns the land.”69
Under this multi-factor approach, the bottom line from Summum is that while
public parks generally constitute traditional public fora70 where content-based sup-
pression of speech undergoes strict scrutiny review71 and where viewpoint-based
61 555 U.S. 460 (2009); infra Sections I.B.1–2; see also Todd E. Pettys, Weddings,
Whiter Teeth, Judicial-Campaign Speech, and More: Civil Cases in the Supreme Court’s
2014–2015 Term, 51 CT. REV. 94, 102 (2015) (asserting that the Court in Walker “relied heavily
upon its 2009 ruling in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum” (footnote omitted)).
62 Summum, 555 U.S. at 464.
63 Id. at 464–65.
64 Id. at 464–66.
65 Id. at 470.
66 Id. at 471.
67 Id. at 478.
68 Id. at 479.
69 Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
70 See RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 116 (2d ed. 2006) (“Traditional public forums are those that historically have been
dedicated to assembly and debate. Primary examples are streets, sidewalks, and parks.”).
71 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (noting that “content-based
restrictions on speech” are permissible “only if they survive strict scrutiny” and adding that
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discrimination is verboten,72 the public “forum analysis simply does not apply” when
it comes to regulating the placement of permanent monuments in those parks.73
Justice Breyer issued a separate concurrence in Summum that stressed he joined
Alito’s opinion for the Court only “on the understanding that the ‘government
speech’ doctrine is a rule of thumb, not a rigid category.”74 Breyer cautioned that the
Court should not be bound by “a jurisprudence of labels” in First Amendment
speech cases but, instead, should engage in a more flexible, proportionality approach
in which it considers “whether a government action burdens speech disproportion-
ately in light of the action’s tendency to further a legitimate government objective.”75
Applying this methodology, Breyer concluded that Pleasant Grove City engaged in
“a proportionate restriction on Summum’s expression[.]”76 Breyer, it should be
noted, has embraced such a proportionality approach in other speech cases.77
Although Breyer ultimately agreed with the outcome reached by Alito in
Summum,78 the two Justices reached radically different conclusions just six years
later in Walker, with Breyer writing for the majority and Alito authoring the
dissent.79 Despite contradictory pronouncements in Walker, both Breyer and Alito
claimed their respective opinions were premised on the Court’s logic and reasoning
in Summum.80 In brief, the Walker majority and dissent both deployed their own
strict scrutiny requires the government to prove that the regulation in question “furthers a com-
pelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end” (citations omitted)); United
States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (asserting that a content-based speech
regulation can only withstand judicial review “if it satisfies strict scrutiny,” noting that “[i]f
a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a com-
pelling Government interest,” and adding that “[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve
the Gov-ernment’s [sic] purpose, the legislature must use that alternative” (citations omitted));
WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 70, at 118 (observing that content-based regulation of speech
in “quintessential public forums . . . is permissible only when the state demonstrates a
compelling interest and the law is narrowly framed to achieve this end” (footnote omitted)).
72 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1190 (5th
ed. 2015) (noting “the impermissibility of viewpoint restrictions in government regulation
of speech in public forums” (citing Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988))).
73 Summum, 555 U.S. at 480 (concluding that “as a general matter, forum analysis simply
does not apply to the installation of permanent monuments on public property”).
74 Id. at 484 (Breyer, J., concurring).
75 Id. (citations omitted).
76 Id. at 485.
77 Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s Fluid Con-
ceptions of Freedom of Speech, 79 ALB. L. REV. 403, 493–94 (2016).
78 Summum, 555 U.S. at 484.
79 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243,
2254 (2015).
80 Justice Breyer wrote in Walker that “[o]ur analysis in Summum leads us to the con-
clusion that here, too, government speech is at issue.” 135 S. Ct. at 2248. Breyer added that
“[o]ur reasoning rests primarily on our analysis in Summum[.]” Id. at 2246.
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Summum-derived tests for government speech and yet, in doing so, arrived at oppo-
site results. The next two subsections describe how the majority and dissent reached
their decisions.
1. The Majority Opinion
Looking to Summum for guidance in Walker, Justice Breyer explained that the
test for government speech involves consideration of: 1) the history of the program,
medium, or venue in or on which messages occur; 2) who a reasonable observer of
the speech would consider is speaking; and 3) who effectively controls the selection
of the messages.81 Applying this test to Walker’s facts, Breyer initially found that
history militated in Texas’s favor because, in part, license plates “long have commu-
nicated messages from the States.”82 Breyer stressed that Texas lawmakers had
approved designs and messages for specialty “plates for decades.”83
Turning to the second factor—the perspective of a reasonable observer—Breyer
opined that “Texas license plates are, essentially, government IDs” and that govern-
ment issuers of IDs “typically do not” feature content with which they do not seek
association.84 People would thus reasonably perceive the plates as conveying a mes-
sage on the issuer’s—in other words, on Texas’s—behalf.85
Breyer added that “the governmental nature of the plates is clear from their
faces: The State places the name ‘TEXAS’ in large letters at the top of every plate.”86
Furthermore, he speculated—not citing any evidence to support his assumption—
that “a person who displays a message on a Texas license plate likely intends to
convey to the public that the State has endorsed that message. If not, the individual
could simply display the message in question in larger letters on a bumper sticker
right next to the plate.”87 The phrase “likely intends” is emphasized because, without
referencing any evidence or research to indicate as such, it is a mere guess by the
majority about why people display specialty plates.
Finally, on the third factor—the individual or entity that effectively controls
selection of the messages in question—Breyer reasoned that “Texas maintains direct
Justice Alito opined that the Breyer-authored majority opinion “badly misunderstands
Summum.” Id. at 2258 (Alito, J., dissenting). Alito wrote that Summum “identified several
important factors” in the government speech determination. Id. In turn, he reasoned that the
characteristics under these factors, “which rendered public monuments government speech
in Summum, are not present in Texas’s specialty plate program.” Id. at 2259.
81 See id. at 2247 (majority opinion).
82 Id. at 2248.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 2249 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471 (2009)).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 2248.
87 Id. at 2249 (emphasis added).
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control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates.”88 He emphasized that
the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board must, pursuant to statutory fiat,
“approve every specialty plate design proposal before the design can appear on a
Texas plate.”89 Such final authority as the decider, as it were, “allows Texas to
choose how to present itself and its constituency.”90 Breyer pointed out, in conclud-
ing that Texas’s specialty plates “are similar enough to the monuments in Summum”91
to constitute government speech, that:
Texas, through its Board, selects each design featured on the
State’s specialty license plates. Texas presents these designs on
government-mandated, government-controlled, and government-
issued IDs that have traditionally been used as a medium for
government speech. And it places the designs directly below the
large letters identifying “TEXAS” as the issuer of the IDs.92
Four Justices, however, disagreed with Breyer. Their dissent is addressed im-
mediately below.
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alito framed his version of the Summum test for the Walker minority in
a slightly different fashion,93 although he too—like Breyer—initially focused on
who, historically, has used the program, medium, or venue in question to speak.94
Alito’s three-part test differed from Breyer’s version, however, on the remaining
two factors. Specifically, the second factor for the minority was the amount or level
of “selective receptivity” and “evidence of selectivity” exercised by the government in
controlling the speech in question.95 Finally, the third factor for the dissent was physical
space and, in particular, whether there is a shortage of space for message display that
might justify government control of speech, free from First Amendment attacks.96
In addition to this three-prong test derived from Summum, Alito proposed a more
holistic, gestalt-like test. It simply asks what a person, sitting by a Texas highway
and watching cars whiz by, might believe in terms of whether “the sentiments
88 Id.
89 Id. (citing 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 217.45(i)(7)–(8), 217.52(b) (2015)).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 2250.
93 This different framing of the test is anything but surprising, given that Alito wrote that
the majority “badly misunderstands Summum.” Id. at 2258 (Alito, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 2258–59.
95 Id. at 2260–61.
96 Id. at 2261–62.
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reflected in these specialty plates are the views of the State of Texas and not those
of the owners[.]”97 In other words, what constitutes government speech is left to the
eyes of a mythical beholder.98
Applying his three-part test to the facts in Walker, Alito initially found that his-
tory weighed against calling Texas’s specialty license plates government speech
because those plates are “quite new” in the Lone Star State.99 In contrast to how
“governments have used monuments since time immemorial to express important
government messages,”100 it was only “within the last 20 years or so” that Texas
allowed private entities to “secure plates conveying their own messages.”101 The
minority’s analysis of the history factor thus conflicts with that of the majority.102
Turning to the degree of selectivity exercised by Texas under its specialty plate
program, Alito concluded the program was “not selective by design” because it was
intended to generate revenue.103 He reasoned here that “Texas does not take care to
approve only those proposed plates that convey messages that the State supports.
Instead, it proclaims that it is open to all private messages—except those, like the
SCV plate, that would offend some who viewed them.”104 Alito also cited the
following question-and-answer content for consumers set forth in a Texas Department
of Motor Vehicles Board brochure: “Q. Who provides the plate design? A. You do,
97 Id. at 2255.
98 Justice Alito’s analysis under this holistic, impression-based standard took the form
of a series of somewhat snarky rhetorical questions designed to suggest that no one sitting
by a Texas highway could possibly believe the government was expressing its views—rather
than those of drivers—on specialty plates:
If a car with a plate that says “Rather Be Golfing” passed by at 8:30 am
on a Monday morning, would you think: “This is the official policy of
the State—better to golf than to work?” If you did your viewing at the
start of the college football season and you saw Texas plates with the
names of the University of Texas’s out-of-state competitors in upcoming
games—Notre Dame, Oklahoma State, the University of Oklahoma,
Kansas State, Iowa State—would you assume that the State of Texas was
officially (and perhaps treasonously) rooting for the Longhorns’ oppo-
nents? And when a car zipped by with a plate that reads “NASCAR—
24 Jeff Gordon,” would you think that Gordon (born in California,
raised in Indiana, resides in North Carolina) is the official favorite of
the State government?
Id. (footnote omitted).
99 Id. at 2260 (asserting that “history here does not suggest that the messages at issue are
government speech”).
100 Id. at 2259.
101 Id. at 2260.
102 See supra notes 82–83 (describing the majority’s analysis of the history factor).
103 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2260. As Alito wrote, specialty plate “programs were adopted be-
cause they bring in money” and that in Texas “the program brings in many millions of dollars
every year.” Id. at 2261–62 (citation omitted).
104 Id. at 2261.
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though your design is subject to reflectivity, legibility, and design standards.”105 The
program has produced, Alito observed, more than 350 different specialty plates,
including those with messages for universities (both in and out of state), commercial
businesses, and non-profit organizations.106
The contrast here with Justice Breyer’s approach for the majority regarding the no-
tion of control is important. While Breyer focused on the fact that Texas ultimately
“maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates[,]”107
Alito and the dissent found the exercise of that control to be exceedingly lax—so
much so that the only reason for excluding requested plates is if the Texas Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles Board determines they “would offend some who viewed
them.”108 Put differently, the dissent zeroed in on the level or degree of selectivity
actually exercised by the government, not simply whether the government holds
final power to reject plates. For the dissent, then, the more closely the government
exercises its authority over speech: the more selective it is in the application process
somewhat akin, perhaps, to an elite university weeding out the vast majority of
applicants—the more likely the medium (permanent monuments in Summum) is to
be classified as government speech.109
Furthermore, Alito focused on the space-scarcity factor that, as he put it, “was
important in Summum.”110 Unlike in Summum, however, where the space shortage
problem was very real because “[a] park can accommodate only so many permanent
monuments,” Alito asserted that “[t]he only absolute limit on the number of specialty
plates that a State could issue is the number of registered vehicles. The variety of
available plates is limitless, too. Today Texas offers more than 350 varieties. In 10
years, might it be 3,500?”111 In brief, there was no shortage of physical space that would
justify government control over otherwise private speech as it did in Summum.112
Counterposed to Alito’s dissent, however, the Breyer majority suggested that
physical scarcity simply was irrelevant in Walker because specialty license plates,
unlike public parks, never have been considered traditional public fora.113 The question
105 Id. at 2260 (quoting a Department brochure).
106 Id. at 2257.
107 Id. at 2249 (majority opinion).
108 Id. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting).
109 See id.
110 Id.
111 Id. Justice Alito’s assertion that the absolute number of possible specialty plates in
Texas is limited only by the number of registered vehicles is somewhat of an exaggeration.
That is because organizations proposing a specialty plate design must demonstrate at least
200 commitments to prove public demand. See TEX. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, PROPOSING
A SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATE 2 (2014), http://www.txdmv.gov/motorists/license-plates/spon
soring-a-specialty-license-plate [https://perma.cc/7FT4-9GFZ] (Click on “How to Propose
a Specialty Plate”).
112 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
113 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249–50 (majority opinion). Breyer explained that while the
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of physical scarcity, in other words, was only relevant in Summum because it helped
to explain the necessity of excluding one medium of expression—permanent monu-
ments—in a traditional public forum where other forms of communication— speeches,
marches, and demonstrations—do not pose such problems and thus receive full First
Amendment protection.114 In brief, the majority intimated that physical scarcity ques-
tions are relevant on the government speech determination only when it comes to
expression situated in traditional public fora like parks and sidewalks.115
Finally, Alito suggested that when it comes to issuing specialty plates, Texas is
not so much concerned with controlling speech as it is with generating money and
selling license-plate space that amounts to “little mobile billboards.”116 As Alito
wrote, “Texas, in effect, sells that space to those who wish to use it to express a
personal message—provided only that the message does not express a viewpoint
that the State finds unacceptable. That is not government speech; it is the regulation
of private speech.”117 Alito’s analysis here thus might be considered a fourth factor—
one that questions whether, under the program in question, the government is more
interested in controlling speech or generating revenue. The Breyer majority dis-
counted and denigrated this fiscal analysis, however, writing that “the existence of
government profit alone is insufficient to trigger forum analysis.”118
The bottom line from Walker is that Justice Alito’s determination that specialty
plates in Texas constitute private expression triggered, for the dissent, a public
forum analysis under which Texas’s banning of the SCV’s proposed plate amounted
to unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination.119 In contrast, Justice Breyer’s
conclusion for the majority that specialty plates in the Lone Star State are govern-
ment speech rendered a public forum analysis moot and allowed, in turn, Texas to
squelch the SCV’s plate without needing to clear any First Amendment hurdles.120
The Walker majority thus was able to prevent the distribution of a license plate
carrying a symbol—the Confederate battle flag—no doubt odious to many people.121
And yet, as Justice Alito cautioned, Walker’s impact goes beyond that symbol and
majority found “that the specialty plates here in question are similar enough to the monu-
ments in Summum to call for the same result,” this conclusion “is not to say that every
element of our discussion in Summum is relevant here.” Id. at 2249 (emphasis added).
114 See id. at 2249–50.
115 See id.
116 Id. at 2262 (Alito, J., dissenting).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 2252 (majority opinion).
119 Id. at 2262 (Alito, J., dissenting).
120 See id. at 2250 (majority opinion) (opining that a “forum analysis is misplaced here.
Because the State is speaking on its own behalf, the First Amendment strictures that attend
the various types of government-established forums do not apply”).
121 Justice Alito acknowledged that the imagery on the SCV’s proposed plate “evoked
painful memories” for its opponents. Id. at 2262 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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threatens the suppression of “many other specialty plates [that] have the potential
to irritate and perhaps even infuriate those who see them.”122
Ultimately, Walker’s five-to-four split on government speech, with majority and
dissent focusing on different factors from Summum and analyzing one seemingly
agreed-upon factor—history—in very different ways, fails to add rigor, clarity or
predictability for deciphering when, in future cases, expression amounts to govern-
ment or private speech. As Professor David Anderson asserts, “[t]he principal lesson
to be gleaned from these opinions is that the government-private dichotomy offers
no predictable way to decide cases; it only produces ipse dixit results.”123 The next
two Parts of this Article thus focus on how some lower courts, through September
2016, attempted to make sense of Walker, with Part II immediately below illustrat-
ing Walker’s impact on specialty license plate programs in other states.
II. SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATE RULINGS AFTER WALKER: LOSSES FOR
PRO-CHOICE AND CONFEDERATE FLAG PLATES
As of September 2016, there had been two post-Walker opinions affecting
specialty license programs in other states. Those cases are described below.
A. North Carolina: The Government Speech Doctrine Allows Discrimination
Against Pro-Choice License Plates
In March 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina v. Tennyson124 considered
whether North Carolina’s specialty license plate program, which offers a “Choose
Life” plate but not a pro-choice option, violated the First Amendment.125 North
Carolina, in fact, had “repeatedly rejected efforts to include a pro-choice license
plate.”126 For example, state lawmakers had forbidden plates with the slogans “Trust
Women. Respect Choice” and “Respect Choice.”127
122 Id.
123 David A. Anderson, Of Horses, Donkeys, and Mules, 94 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 4
(2015), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Anderson-94-SeeAlso.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/GJA7-XDCD].
124 815 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2016).
125 Id. at 184.
126 Deborah Elkins, Specialty License Plate Upheld After Walker, VA. LAW. WKLY.
(Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.valawyersweekly.com/2016/03/21/specialty-license-plate-up
held-after-walker/ [https://perma.cc/P8V3-N352].
127 Colin Campbell, ‘Choose Life’ License Plate Upheld as Federal Court Reverses Ruling,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 10, 2016, 1:47 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news
/politics-government/article65205912.html [https://perma.cc/J8DQ-V34Y].
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More than one year prior to Walker, the Fourth Circuit issued a permanent
injunction against this abortion-related facet of the Tar Heel State’s specialty plate
program.128 It concluded then that “issuing a ‘Choose Life’ specialty license plate
while refusing to issue a pro-choice specialty plate constitutes blatant viewpoint
discrimination squarely at odds with the First Amendment.”129
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, vacated that ruling just eleven days after its
Walker decision.130 In doing so, the Court remanded the case to “the Fourth Circuit
for further consideration in light of Walker[.]”131
Walker proved to be a radical game-changer on remand for the Fourth Circuit.
Importantly, it did so precisely in the conservative-leaning manner feared by Erwin
Chemerinsky.132
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held, in a two-to-one ruling in Tennyson, that
“the Walker Court’s analysis is dispositive of the issues in this case. Accordingly,
we now conclude that specialty license plates issued under North Carolina’s pro-
gram amount to government speech and that North Carolina is therefore free to
reject license plate designs that convey messages with which it disagrees.”133 The
two-Justice majority opinion is cursory—it spans a mere five paragraphs—and
somewhat summarily finds that the Tar Heel State’s specialty license plate program
is “substantively indistinguishable from that in Walker.”134 The Fourth Circuit thus
reversed its earlier decision and, in doing so, ruled in favor of North Carolina’s
discriminatory specialty plate system that privileges pro-life plates and shuns pro-
choice possibilities.135
The outcome in North Carolina should not be a surprise, given the result in
Walker. As Professor Scott Lemieux wrote in The Guardian shortly after Walker
was decided, “[t]he Court’s decision, of course, will not only cut in one ideological
direction. Based on the ruling, lower courts will almost certainly . . . rule that North
Carolina is permitted to offer a ‘Choose Life’ license plate without offering a pro-
choice alternative.”136 Yet, Sarah Preston—executive director of the American Civil
128 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Tata, 742 F.3d 563, 566 (4th Cir. 2014), vacated
sub nom. Berger v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 2886 (2015).
129 Id.
130 Berger, 135 S. Ct. at 2886.
131 Id.
132 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.




136 Scott Lemieux, The Supreme Court Is Right: Confederate Flag License Plates Aren’t
Free Speech, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2015, 1:47 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentis
free/2015/jun/18/us-supreme-court-confederate-license-plates-arent-free-speech [https://perma
.cc/RD8C-MTDS].
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Liberties Union of North Carolina, which litigated the case—called it “very disap-
pointing that North Carolina can now deny drivers on one side of this contentious
issue an equal ability to express their views[.]”137
Conservative court-watchers who objected to Walker’s outcome, however,
probably considered the result in Tennyson fitting payback. Viewed from the
perspective of, admittedly, the most sweeping of stereotypes: If the political left won
Walker by using the government speech doctrine to permit Texas’s banning of li-
cense plates featuring Confederate battle flag imagery, then the political and reli-
gious right triumphed in Tennyson via the government speech doctrine by stifling
pro-choice license plates and allowing pro-life ones.
Columnist Noah Feldman opined in the Dallas Morning News that the Fourth
Circuit’s ruling in Tennyson “shows a serious flaw in the Supreme Court’s free-
speech jurisprudence.”138 Although acknowledging the decision was “technically
correct under” Walker, Feldman lambasted the result:
The North Carolina case makes the viewpoint discrimination
especially clear because the abortion issue has two easily recog-
nized sides. If you want an abortion-rights plate to speak against
the anti-abortion plate, you simply can’t get one. The message
is by definition unavailable to you.
It isn’t just that the government disagrees with you. It’s actively
giving the other side a forum while denying the same forum to
you.139
Indeed, Tennyson simply confirms that Walker gives the government the ability
to discriminate, in blatant viewpoint-based fashion, against political opinions
(abortion being a political issue) to which it objects, so long as the venue or medium
for the expression—permanent monuments in parks in Summum, specialty plates on
vehicles in Walker—is classified as one for government speech rather than a public
forum for private speech.
Dissenting in Tennyson, however, Judge James Wynn argued that North Caro-
lina’s specialty plates are not “pure government speech” controlled by Walker but,
instead, constitute “mixed speech—with private speech components that prohibit view-
point discrimination.”140 In other words, Wynn sought a middle ground, rejecting a
binary approach where speech is either purely government or purely private and,
137 Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Appeals Court Reverses Ruling on North Caro-
lina ‘Choose Life’ License Plate Case (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/appeals-court
-reverses-ruling-north-carolina-choose-life-license-plate-case [https://perma.cc/4CDA-Z79D].
138 Noah Feldman, The Problem with the Anti-Abortion Specialty License Plate, DALL. NEWS
(Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2016/03/15/noah-feldman
-the-problem-with-the-anti-abortion-specialty-license-plate [https://perma.cc/9H52-AZY2].
139 Id.
140 Tennyson, 815 F.3d at 185–86 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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instead, recognizing there may be hybrid scenarios that blend elements of govern-
ment and private speech.141 He pointed out that the Fourth Circuit has “recognized
‘mixed speech’—that is, speech that is ‘neither purely government speech nor purely
private speech, but a mixture of the two.’”142
Wynn illustrated his mixed-speech conclusion about the specialty plates in
Tennyson by citing and then applying the Walker majority’s three-factor approach
to government speech.143 He encapsulated the test as considering: “(1) ‘the history
of license plates;’ (2) observers’ ‘routine’ and ‘reasonable’ associations between the
speech at issue and the state; and (3) the extent of state control over the message
conveyed.”144 On the history prong, Wynn found that North Carolina repeatedly
invited vehicle owners with common interests to make statements promoting them-
selves or their causes.145 “This history[,]” Wynn wrote, “supports the conclusion that
the challenged speech was not the government’s.”146
He then considered the mental associations that observers of specialty plates
make in terms of whether the government or a private person is speaking.147 Wynn
found here that North Carolina’s repeated invitation to vehicle owners to create state-
ments on specialty plates to promote themselves or their causes “has surely sunken
in and must impact the way the North Carolina public views its specialty plates—as
a forum allowing them to make a statement and promote themselves and their causes,
just as their government described.”148
The first two factors, both of which, at least for Wynn, involved considering the
state’s invitation to vehicle owners to express themselves, thus suggested to him that
the messages on specialty plates are private speech.149 Yet, on the third factor—
government control—he found that in North Carolina, “as in Walker, the state govern-
ment controls the final wording and appearance of specialty plates.”150 This factor,
Wynn opined, “tilts in the government’s favor.”151
Wynn ultimately concluded that:
the speech at issue is a mixed picture tilting in favor of private
speech. I do not deny that some elements of North Carolina’s
141 See id.
142 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 789 (4th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1119 (2005)).
143 Id. at 186–88.
144 Id. at 186–87 (quoting Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2239, 2248–49 (2015)).
145 Id. at 187.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 187–88.
148 Id. at 188.
149 Id. at 187–88.
150 Id. at 188 (citations omitted).
151 Id.
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specialty plates, like the state name and the vehicle’s tag number,
are unquestionably government speech. But the “designated seg-
ment of the plate [that] shall be set aside for unique design repre-
senting various groups and interests” can, and here does, contain
private speech.152
Because specialty plates in North Carolina are “not pure government speech,”153
Wynn held that the usual First Amendment safeguards against viewpoint-based
discrimination apply154 and, in turn, that North Carolina’s “allowing a ‘Choose Life’
plate while rejecting a pro-choice plate constitutes viewpoint discrimination in
violation of the First Amendment.”155
Wynn’s approach suggests three possible outcomes in cases where the govern-
ment claims it is speaking:
1. Pure government speech: The government is free to discriminate against
viewpoints with which it disagrees.
2. Mixed speech: The government may not discriminate against viewpoints
with which it disagrees.156
3. Pure private speech: The government may not discriminate against view-
points with which it disagrees.
Several things are unclear, however, from Wynn’s analysis. As noted above, he
found that two of the three Walker factors weighed in favor of private speech, while
only “the control factor tilts in the government’s favor.”157 Thus, as he put it, the
case presents “a mixed picture tilting in favor of private speech.”158
The question, of course, is: What if two out of the three factors had weighed in
favor of calling specialty plates government speech? Would this “tilting,” to use
Wynn’s term, toward government speech have flipped the case out of the mixed-
speech category and back into the pure government speech category? In other
words, how many factors—or, perhaps, which factors, if some count for more than
others—must militate in favor of private speech before a case with some govern-
ment speech elements is considered mixed?
152 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-79.4 (2016)).
153 Id. at 189.
154 See id. at 188 (“Because the speech at issue is not purely the government’s, the First
Amendment’s constraints on viewpoint discrimination apply.”).
155 Id. at 189.
156 See id. at 188. As Judge Wynn wrote, “[b]ecause the speech at issue is not purely the
government’s, the First Amendment’s constraints on viewpoint discrimination apply.” Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. (emphasis added).
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This leads, in turn, to the question of whether Wynn’s “mixed speech”159 cate-
gory is a legal term of art—one under which a certain minimum percentage or
proportion of the evidence (not merely the existence of any shred of private-speech
evidence) must weigh in favor of private speech before it fits into Wynn’s mixed-
speech category. In other words, perhaps not just any mixture nudges expression
across the goal line and into the end zone of First Amendment–protected mixed
speech. Precisely how imbued with private speech elements must expression be to
constitute “mixed speech” and therefore be subject to First Amendment safeguards?
That is a key question left unanswered.
Wynn thus might be lauded for recognizing the possibility of mixed-speech
scenarios and, in doing so, suggesting that this third, hybrid category provides a
mechanism for rejecting viewpoint-based discrimination in cases like Tennyson.
Wynn cited twice the work of Professor David Anderson for pointing him in this
mixed-speech direction.160 Other scholars—notably, Professors Corey Brettschneider
and Nelson Tebbe—have argued that specialty plates constitute mixed speech.161
Yet, Wynn leaves muddled the mixed-speech category by failing to provide a clear
formula for determining when expression falls into it. A mixed-speech classification
thus appeals in theory, but in practice—as is so much of the government speech
doctrine—is problematic.
B. Virginia: Another Defeat for the Sons of Confederate Veterans
Just as Walker caused the Fourth Circuit to reverse itself in Tennyson, it prompted
Senior United States District Judge Jackson L. Kiser in Sons of Confederate Veter-
ans, Inc. v. Holcomb162 to overturn his earlier decision—one dating back more than
a dozen years163—declaring unconstitutional, as an instance of viewpoint-based
censorship,164 a Virginia statute preventing the SCV from obtaining a specialty plate
159 Id. at 186.
160 Id. at 185, 189 (citing Anderson, supra note 123, at 4).
161 See, e.g., Corey Brettschneider & Nelson Tebbe, A License to Say Anything?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2015, at A19 (“License plates are an important form of ‘mixed speech,’
blending both government and private messages. The court must balance the private right to
free speech with the government’s interest in conveying its own messages.”).
162 No. 7:99-cv-00530, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103603 (W.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2015).
163 Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d 941 (W.D. Va. 2001),
aff’d, 288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002), vacated, No. 7:99-cv-00530, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103603 (W.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2015).
164 Kiser wrote in 2001:
I find that the Commonwealth’s exclusion of the Sons’ logo is viewpoint-
based. Plaintiffs’ logo can be designed to meet the objective parameters
that all specialty plates require, such as placement and size. It is clear
to me, however, that the motivation behind the Commonwealth’s ban
of logos or emblems was to avoid controversy by preventing Plaintiffs
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bearing a “logo or emblem of any description.”165 This law was passed because
“Virginia lawmakers had deemed the logo’s Confederate battle flag too divisive.”166
First Amendment scholar Vincent Blasi predicted in 1999, shortly after the SCV
filed suit against Virginia, that the state had “probably gone too far in allowing this
sort of thing to say it can restrict it for one group now.”167
Blasi’s prognostication proved particularly prescient. In his initial and now-
reversed ruling in 2001, Judge Kiser remarked that the Virginia law “was clearly
aimed at excluding the organization’s official logo, which incorporates the Confed-
erate battle flag.”168 This seemed especially clear because no other organization
seeking specialty plates in Virginia was prohibited by statute from including a logo
or emblem on its designs.169
Kiser, in 2001, also rejected Virginia’s argument that specialty plates constitute
government speech and, in turn, its contention “that it may veto the content because it
cannot be compelled to speak unwillingly.”170 The judge found, instead, that expression
on specialty “plates honoring private entities is speech of those entities.”171 Among
the pieces of evidence leading him to this private-speech conclusion were the facts
that “[t]he design of specialty plates is left entirely to the organization” and that “the
DMV repeatedly uses the possessive pronoun ‘your,’ as in ‘your design’ and ‘your
plate,’ when corresponding with groups regarding design of specialty plates.”172
This last observation—the “your”173 language, as it were, used by Virginia when
communicating to the public about specialty plates—might have laid the foundation
for Judge Wynn’s similar logic in his 2016 Tennyson dissent arguing that North
Carolina’s specialty plates are private speech.174 Wynn, as explained earlier, noted
from designing a plate that displays the Confederate battle flag. Out of
hundreds of specialty plates in existence, only that bearing the Sons’
logo is targeted.
Id. at 946.
165 VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-746.22 (2016).
166 Michael Leahy, EYE L SUE U 4 PLATES: Virginia’s Special Tags Become Litigation
Headache, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1999, at C1.
167 Id. (quoting Vincent Blasi, law professor at Columbia University and the University
of Virginia).
168 Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
169 As Judge Kiser wrote, the statute targeting the Sons of Confederate Veterans “is
identical to numerous other specialty license plate provisions with the sole exception of the
ban on displaying any logos or emblems.” Id.
170 Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995)).
171 Id. at 945.
172 Id. at 944.
173 Id.
174 See Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 2016)
(Wynn, J., dissenting).
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that “North Carolina expressly and repeatedly ‘invite[d] its vehicle owners to “[m]ake
a statement with a specialized or personalized license plate” and to “find the plate
that fits you.”’”175 Judicial focus on the government’s own language and messages
to the public might prove profitable in other contexts—ones beyond specialty license
plates—where the government runs programs that invite private entities to participate
with the added incentive of giving them naming rights, such as Adopt-A-Highway
trash removal programs.176
Ultimately, in tossing out his own 2001 ruling, Judge Kiser explained—perhaps
somewhat apologetically—that he had no alternative but to reverse it.177 He wrote
in his August 2015 opinion that:
[w]hen the Supreme Court speaks, district courts must listen. In
light of the ruling in Walker, the primary rationale for the 2001
judgment and injunction in this case is no longer good law. Spe-
cialty license plates represent the government’s speech, and the
Commonwealth may choose, consonant with the First Amendment,
the message it wishes to convey on those plates. The Common-
wealth’s rationale for singling out SCV for different treatment is
no longer relevant. According to the Supreme Court, the Com-
monwealth is free to treat SCV differently from all other specialty
groups. Because the underlying injunction violates that right, I
have no choice but to dissolve it.178
Judge Kiser’s 2001 ruling, buttressed by an affirming 2002 decision by the
Fourth Circuit,179 had forced Virginia to offer SCV plates bearing Confederate battle
flag logos and, by 2015, there were “about 1,600 on the road[.]”180 Virginia was not
alone in offering such a plate. In fact, by early 2015, at least ten states had specialty
plates featuring the Confederate battle flag.181
175 Id. (quoting Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Tata, 742 F.3d 563, 572 (4th Cir. 2014),
vacated sub nom. Berger v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 2886 (2015)).
176 See Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735, 738, 744–45 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 1054 (2005) (involving a First Amendment–based challenge by the Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan to Missouri’s Adopt-A-Highway program and rejecting Missouri’s argument
that the program “involves only government speech”).
177 Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, No. 7:99-cv-00530, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103603, at *10–11 (W.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2015).
178 Id. 
179 Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288
F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002).
180 Laura Vozzella & Jenna Portnoy, Virginia Will Phase Out Confederate-Flag License
Plates, WASH. POST, June 24, 2015, at B1.
181 See Rosalind Bentley, Confederate Specialty Plates: Battle Flag Licenses Case May
Affect Ga., ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 24, 2015, at A1 (reporting that more than 3,500 drivers
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Walker, however, flipped the script, giving states authority to ban such plates
and remove existing ones. As Rhodes Ritenour, Virginia’s deputy attorney general,
stated in an August 2015 hearing, the state’s “DMV has begun an internal process to
work with the Sons of Confederate Veterans to come up with an alternative license
plate design.”182 Other states now might follow suit.
C. Summary
The post-Walker specialty license plate rulings in Virginia and North Carolina re-
sulted, respectively, in another (and quite predictable) Walker-like ban of Confederate
battle flag imagery and the rejection of a pro-choice plate in the face of a government-
sanctioned pro-life option. The government speech doctrine thus leads both to censor-
ship of expression the government finds offensive (the Confederate battle flag) and
viewpoint-based discrimination on political issues (denial of a pro-choice plate).
In both situations, the government took a clear side on an issue of social and
cultural importance. Regarding the Confederate battle flag, Virginia adopted the
position of those who consider the flag to be a symbol of racism and hatred.183 In
doing so, it rejected the view that the flag more benignly symbolizes southern heri-
tage and pride. In North Carolina, the State took the side of the pro-life movement
on the topic of abortion and rebuffed the pro-choice position.184
The dissent in Tennyson rejected the binary government-speech-versus-private-
speech framework and proposed a third category of mixed speech.185 This classifica-
tion would provide First Amendment protection to specialty plates and, in turn,
would thwart viewpoint-based discrimination targeting the pro-choice plates.186
Although a mixed-speech category provides jurists reticent to embrace viewpoint-
based discrimination with an escape hatch from application of the government
speech doctrine, this Article pointed out that the contours of the category are murky
at best. Both the amount and proportion of private speech elements that must be
present in a hybrid scenario to rise to the level of First Amendment–protected mixed
speech is unsettled. Additionally, it is unclear whether the presence of any single
private speech element or variable might constitute either a necessary or sufficient
condition for such a determination. In other words, the presence of some facets of
private speech might be weighted differently than others.
The next Part of this Article moves beyond Walker’s application to the narrow
confines of specialty license plates. Specifically, it explores how lower courts
in Georgia “have paid for . . . specialty plates bearing [the Confederate battle flag] image”
and that “[a]t least nine other states offer similar plates”).
182 Antonio Olivo, Va. Ban on Rebel Flag Tags Upheld, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2015, at B1.
183 See Leahy, supra note 166, at C1.
184 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183, 184 (4th Cir. 2016).
185 Id. at 185–87 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 185–89.
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grappled with Walker in four different scenarios in which governmental entities
claimed their discrimination against speech was immune from First Amendment
attack because the forum or program in question was not public but, instead, was
designed for government speech.
III. EXTENDING WALKER’S LOGIC AND REASONING BEYOND SPECIALTY
LICENSE PLATES: FROM HIGHWAY WELCOME CENTERS TO THE
FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION PROCESS
This Part features four sections, each of which separately addresses a recent,
post-Walker court battle over the alleged application of the government speech doc-
trine to a context other than specialty license plates.
A. Public Schools, Partnership Banners, and Porn Stars: Stopping Offense in Its
Sordid Tracks Via Government Speech
The best way to encapsulate the November 2015 ruling by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Mech v. School Board of Palm Beach
County187 is in the form of a legal riddle. Question: When is an advertisement for a
private business not, in fact, an advertisement? Answer: When it hangs from a public
school fence and constitutes, instead, a mere expression of the school’s gratitude
toward the business as a “Partner in Excellence” for making a monetary donation.
And, as described below, the key for resolving the riddle and reaching that answer
is the pliability of the government speech doctrine.
Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit held in Mech that a public school program
allowing private businesses to hang promotional, school-partnership banners from
school fences in exchange for monetary donations188 constitutes “government
speech.”189 Under the program’s rules, donors are dubbed “business partners,” with
their contributions helping to support “key programs” in the schools.190 In return for
a donation, a business gains public recognition through a banner limited in content to
the business’s “name, phone number, web address, and logo,” as well as a mandated
“message thanking the sponsor.”191 In Mech, this message was a phrase identifying
the plaintiff’s business as a “Partner in Excellence.”192
David Mech is a Boca Raton, Florida, resident193 who holds a master’s degree
from Arizona State University and who is certified in the Sunshine State as a
187 806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016).
188 The minimum donation for a banner ranges from $250 to $650. Id. at 1073.
189 Id. at 1072 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009)).
190 Id. (quoting Sch. Bd. Policies 7.151, SCH. BOARD PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., http://
www.schoolboardpolicies.com/p/7.151 [https://perma.cc/LWU4-Q9DE]).
191 Id. at 1072–73.
192 Id. at 1073.
193 Scott Travis, Former Porn Star Loses Appeal in Tutoring Business Lawsuit, SUN SEN-
TINEL (Fla.), Nov. 24, 2015, at 3B.
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secondary math teacher.194 He successfully sought to have his business participate
in the banner program.195 After making the requisite donations in 2010, Mech re-
ceived fence-hung banners at three different schools, each bearing the name, phone
number, and website address for his “The Happy/Fun Math Tutor” business.196 In
considering Mech’s application, a school board representative observed that Mech
“apparently is a very good tutor.”197
Unbeknownst to the board, however, Mech apparently was also very good, at
least during an earlier phase of life, at something entirely different: performing adult
sex scenes on camera.198 As the owner of Dave Pounder Productions, Mech “per-
formed in hundreds of pornographic films.”199
A Tampa Tribune article notes that “Mech worked in the porn industry from
2001 to 2010, as an actor, director, and producer. He has appeared as Dave Pounder
in such films as ‘I Scored a Soccer Mom,’ ‘Entering the Student Body,’ and ‘Univer-
sity Coed Oral Exams 14.’”200 In 2010, however, Mech stopped making adult movies,
and Dave Pounder Productions, in turn, began “producing a documentary about the
psychological impact of working in adult films called ‘Risky Business’ and a book
analyzing relationships.”201 The book, Obscene Thoughts: A Pornographer’s Per-
spective on Sex, Love, and Dating, was published in 2013 under Mech’s porn name.202
Kirkus Reviews calls it a “brisk, enjoyable dissertation on the ways of love and lust”
and “[a]n iconoclastic, argument-starting take on the battle of the sexes.”203 When
not writing or tutoring math, Mech advocates for the health and safety of adult per-
formers, including mandatory condom usage in the adult industry.204 He also has
194 Mech, 806 F.3d at 1072.
195 Id. at 1072–73.
196 Id. at 1073.
197 Id. (quoting a representative of the School Board).
198 Id. at 1072.
199 Id.
200 Scott Travis, Ex-Porn Actor Loses Free-Speech Lawsuit Against School District,
TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 4, 2014, at 5.
201 Jason Schultz, Former Adult Film Star Will Run for Seat on School Board, PALM
BEACH POST (Fla.), June 18, 2014, at 2B.
202 DAVID POUNDER, OBSCENE THOUGHTS: A PORNOGRAPHER’S PERSPECTIVE ON SEX,
LOVE, AND DATING (W.B. King ed., 2013).
203 Kirkus Review: Obscene Thoughts: A Pornographer’s Perspective on Sex, Love, and
Dating, KIRKUS REV. (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/dave
-pounder/obscene-thoughts [https://perma.cc/4G2L-Z4JW].
204 See Biography—Dave Pounder, DAVE POUNDER, http://www.davepounder.com/bio
.html [https://perma.cc/8J8L-JA8K] (noting that Pounder “played an active role in advocating
for performer health and safety, having consulted with BioCollections Worldwide to expand
STI testing and to develop secure online producer access to performer test results,” and
adding that he “is a strong proponent of federal legislation mandating condom use in the
production, distribution, and retail sales of adult content”).
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consulted for the Los Angeles County Health Department and the California Divi-
sion of Occupational Safety and Health.205
Such noble efforts and literary endeavors in his post-porn life earned Mech no
favor, however, with school officials in Palm Beach County. Upon learning of his
carnal career—parents complained after discovering Mech’s math-tutoring business
and Dave Pounder Productions were commonly owned—the banners for his tutoring
enterprise were removed.206
This came despite the fact that Mech’s banners, as the Broward—Palm Beach
New Times colorfully put it, “just advertised his tutoring business and made no
reference to his days of lady-pounding.”207 As Mech told a reporter, “If I was
advertising ‘Dave Pounder Productions’ at school, I’d be okay with people saying
‘What are you doing?’. . . . But what I did was perfectly lawful.”208 In brief, the
banners did not contain any offensive messages. Instead, it was the former occupa-
tion of the business’s owner that drew the school board’s wrath.
With his banners no longer hung, the erstwhile porn star fired back, filing a
lawsuit in federal court claiming their removal violated his First Amendment right
of free speech.209 The district court, however, granted summary judgment for the
school board, holding, in a pre-Walker ruling, that “the schools did not abridge the
First Amendment because they removed the banners due to the common ownership
of Mech’s companies, not the content of the banners.”210
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the parties to brief how the Supreme
Court’s Walker ruling affected the case.211 While Mech argued the banners are
private speech in a limited public forum, the school board countered that they are
government expression.212
In analyzing the government speech issue, the Eleventh Circuit initially noted
that the Supreme Court has failed to create “a precise test for separating government
speech from private speech[.]”213 In fact, the opening line of its opinion telegraphed
that there might be trouble ahead on the government speech issue, as the Eleventh
Circuit quoted the epigraph at the start of this Article214 from Summum: “There may
205 Id.
206 Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1073 (11th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016).
207 Jerry Ianelli, Ex-Porn Star, Now a Math Tutor, Appealing Legal Case to the Supreme




209 Mech, 806 F.3d at 1073.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 1074.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 See supra text accompanying note 1.
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be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking
on its own behalf or is providing a forum for private speech[.]”215
The appellate court nonetheless observed that the Supreme Court in Walker fo-
cused on three factors: 1) the history of the speech; 2) whether a reasonable observer
would consider that the government agrees with or endorses the speech’s content;
and 3) whether the government has “direct control over the messages.”216 Tidily
identifying each factor in a single word—“history, endorsement, and control”—the
Eleventh Circuit added that these Walker factors arose from the Court’s earlier rul-
ing in Summum.217
Applying this tripartite test, the appellate court concluded the banners are gov-
ernment speech.218 Starting with the history factor, the Eleventh Circuit set forth the
principle that while “[a] medium that has long communicated government messages
is more likely to be government speech,” a lengthy history is not determinative of
the issue or even a requirement to hold that expression is government speech.219 As
the court wrote, “a long historical pedigree is not a prerequisite for government
speech,” and an “absence of historical evidence can be overcome by other indicia
of government speech.”220 In a nutshell, even new programs and media for expres-
sion may be government speech.
Applying these principles regarding history to the facts in Mech, the Eleventh
Circuit found the banner program to be of “relatively recent vintage: the School
Board launched it in 2008 and codified it in 2011.”221 Unfortunately, this newness
did not help Mech’s cause.
Indeed, the appellate court reasoned that while the “absence of historical evi-
dence weighs in Mech’s favor,” the lack of historical evidence supporting a govern-
ment speech determination was “not decisive.”222 In brief, although the banner
program lacked a lengthy history, this factor was given short shrift. The Eleventh
Circuit used an example to explain why even a new medium of expression might
constitute government speech: “[I]f the School Board posted a message about school
closings for inclement weather on Facebook or Twitter, we would have little dif-
ficulty classifying the message as government speech, even though social media is
a relatively new phenomenon.”223
215 Mech, 806 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470
(2009)).
216 Id. at 1074–75 (quoting Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2239, 2249 (2015)).
217 Id. at 1075.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 1075–76 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
220 Id. at 1076.
221 Id. at 1075.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 1076 (citations omitted).
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Turning to what it called the “endorsement” factor,224 the Eleventh Circuit found
that it “strongly suggests that the banners are government speech. The banners are
hung on school fences, and government property is ‘often closely identified in the
public mind with the government unit that owns the land.’”225 In addition, the court
recognized two other variables suggesting endorsement: 1) the banners used school
colors, not ones chosen by the businesses; and 2) the banners featured the phrase
“Partner in Excellence,” suggesting “that the sponsor has a close relationship with
the school[.]”226
Focusing heavily on inclusion of the “Partner in Excellence” tagline, the court
speculated that the “positive association” it allegedly generates “is likely why
sponsors participate in the banner program, instead of appealing to parents and
students through ‘purely private’ media.”227 The Eleventh Circuit added that “Part-
ner in Excellence” amounts to “the schools’ way of saying ‘thank you’”228 and that,
in turn, “[s]uch gestures of gratitude are a common form of government speech,”229
akin to a public radio station thanking a contributor.230
In considering the endorsement factor, the Eleventh Circuit also rebuffed
Mech’s argument that the banners “are private speech because they are essentially
advertisements; they invite the reader to do business with the sponsor, not the
school.”231 The appellate court reasoned that the banners lack the traditional trap-
pings of “purely private advertising[.]”232 Specifically, the court wrote:
Private advertisements are typically designed by the advertisers:
they convey the words, pictures, and colors that the advertiser
wants to convey. . . . The banners on the school fences, by con-
trast, are printed in school colors and are subject to uniform
design requirements imposed by the schools. Each banner bears
the initials of the school and identifies the sponsor as a “partner”
with the school.233
224 Id. As the court explained, this factor considers whether “observers reasonably believe
the government has endorsed the message[.]” Id.
225 Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009)).
226 Id. (citing Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2249 (2015)).
227 Id.
228 Id. at 1077.
229 Id.
230 Id. (citing Wells v. City of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141–42 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 997 (2001); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d
1085, 1093 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000)).
231 Id. at 1076.
232 Id. at 1077.
233 Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Finally, turning to the third government speech factor, control over the speech,
the Eleventh Circuit determined that this factor, like the endorsement consideration,
“strongly suggests that the banners are government speech.”234 The court reasoned
that the schools dictate multiple aspects of the banners, including: 1) color; 2) type-
face; 3) design; 4) size; and 5) hanging location.235 The Eleventh Circuit further
pointed out that the program mandates that all banners include school initials and
the “Partner in Excellence” tagline.236
Mech asserted, on the control factor, “that the schools do not meaningfully
control the messages on the banners because the bulk of the information—the logo,
name, phone number, and web address—comes from the sponsor, not the school.”237
The Eleventh Circuit spurned this argument, pointing out that in both Summum and
Walker, private entities actually designed their own messages, yet those messages
were still treated as government speech.238 Under the banner program, sponsors like
David Mech “have even less say-so about the messages on the banners. The schools
do not allow the banners to list anything but the sponsor’s name, contact informa-
tion, and preexisting business logo.”239
In summary, although the history factor militated for Mech, it was outweighed
by evidence supporting a finding of government speech under the endorsement and
control variables. The Eleventh Circuit thus concluded the schools’ banners were
government speech, not private expression, and Mech’s First Amendment claim
therefore failed.240
At least four facets of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis are striking. First, even a
very brief history of the government purportedly speaking through the medium in
question (in Mech, via banners) does not, standing alone, destroy a government
speech argument.241 This logic significantly eases the government’s burden and, in
turn, its path toward permissible censorship.
By implication, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to history also suggests a totality-
of-the-circumstances methodology in analyzing government speech, in which the
absence of a factor does not preclude determining the expression is government
speech. Instead, the government can win by proving that just two of three factors tilt
in its favor.
A second important facet of Mech is the Eleventh Circuit’s characterization of
the second Walker factor as one of government endorsement of a message rather




238 Id. at 1078–79.
239 Id. at 1079.
240 Id.
241 See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text (addressing the history factor in Mech).
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than a mere association or identification in the public’s mind of the message with
the government.242 In Walker, in considering who—either a private person or Texas—
observers of the speech at issue would perceive as speaking, the majority speculated
that “a person who displays a message on a Texas license plate likely intends to
convey to the public that the State has endorsed that message.”243 Yet in Summum,
in holding that permanent monuments donated by private entities in public parks
constitute government speech, the Court wrote that “[b]y accepting such a monu-
ment, a government entity does not necessarily endorse the specific meaning that
any particular donor sees in the monument.”244
The issue becomes whether there is a difference between a reasonable observer
simply associating a message with a governmental entity or requiring the observer
to perceive that the government is endorsing the message, with the latter seeming
to be a much more rigorous requirement. Either route, however, is highly speculative,
with jurists having to guess how supposedly reasonable observers would perceive
and interpret messages.
A third striking facet of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis relates to control. While
the schools clearly control many elements of the banners in question, this would not
satisfy Justice Alito and the Walker dissent’s interpretation of this element.245 Spe-
cifically, the Walker dissent focused on “selective receptivity”246 in exercising authority
over the messages.
This analysis, as applied to Mech, would require the Eleventh Circuit to consider
how many other banners it had rejected and, in contrast, how many it accepted. The
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion fails to cite a single other instance of a sponsor being
denied a banner.247 If David Mech’s banner was, in fact, the only one rejected out
of dozens of applications, then this indicates that the schools failed to exercise their
authority over banners selectively. Such an outcome illustrates the critical impor-
tance of the difference in understanding of the meaning of “control” between the
five Justices in the Walker majority and the four Justices in the dissent.
While the Eleventh Circuit, of course, was not bound to follow the Walker dis-
sent’s logic here, the distinction between the Walker majority’s approach to control—
who controls the ultimate decision—and the dissent’s approach—the degree of
selectivity exercised by the government in wielding its power—can prove game-
changing. Had the Eleventh Circuit used the tack taken by the Walker dissent on
242 See supra notes 224–33 and accompanying text (addressing the endorsement factor in
Mech).
243 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249 (2015)
(emphasis added).
244 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476–77 (2009) (emphasis added).
245 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2260–61 (Alito, J., dissenting).
246 Id.
247 See generally Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1073 (11th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016).
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control, it would have resulted in two factors—history and control—tilting in favor
of David Mech.
The fourth and, perhaps, most striking aspect of the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling
meriting further consideration is that it made no difference that the schools discrimi-
nated against Mech’s banners not because of their content, but because of the iden-
tity of the person attempting to speak—namely, former porn star David Mech.248 If
the government speech doctrine was cast aside, such speaker-based discrimination
would be blatantly unconstitutional after the United States Supreme Court’s ruling
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.249
There, Justice Anthony Kennedy emphasized for the majority that “the Govern-
ment may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred
speakers.”250 He elaborated that “[t]he Government may not . . . deprive the public
of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy
of consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas
that flow from each.”251
Scholars concur about the importance of Citizens United when it comes to
preventing speaker-based discrimination. For instance, Professor Michael Kagan
contends that the Court in Citizens United:
for the first time gave full-throated articulation to the principle that
discrimination on the basis of the identity of the speaker is of-
fensive to the First Amendment, even when there is no content
discrimination. This newly articulated doctrine has the potential
to reshape free speech law far beyond the corporate and election
contexts.252
Similarly, Kathleen Sullivan, former dean of the Stanford Law School, asserts that
after Citizens United, “[g]overnment regulation is suspect not only when it discrimi-
nates among viewpoints . . . but also when it discriminates among speakers.”253
Mech thus calls attention to another problem with the government speech
doctrine—not only can it be used to censor messages the government deems offen-
sive, but it can target private individuals and entities with whom the government
does not desire association. In Mech, the school board did not want to be linked to
David Mech because of his former occupation. The government speech doctrine, in
248 See id. at 1073.
249 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
250 Id. at 340.
251 Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
252 Michael Kagan, Speaker Discrimination: The Next Frontier of Free Speech, 42 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 765, 766 (2015).
253 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143,
155 (2010) (emphasis added).
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other words, provides a vehicle for allowing a person’s past to haunt him in perpetuity
when it comes to freedom of speech. It is as if Mech, due to his former job, had com-
mitted a felony that justified stripping him of his First Amendment right of speech.
In May 2016, Mech petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, asking it to consider whether Walker “allow[s] the government to place
an imprimatur on private advertising and thereby render the advertisement govern-
ment speech, stripping it of all First Amendment protection?”254 Suggesting the
importance of that issue, the Supreme Court of the United States Blog—better
known as SCOTUSblog—later named it a “petition of the day.”255
Mech argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s “reasoning is faulty because it disre-
gards the narrow and limited nature of this Court’s 5-to-4 decision in Walker.”256
Specifically, the petition asserts, in key part, that:
Unlike the license plates at issue in Walker, the banner advertise-
ments here are not government IDs over which the School Board
exercises absolute control over language or design. Nor do they
have the history as government speech found so significant in
Walker. And while the circuit court’s decision places great weight
on the language “Partners in Excellence,” this statement is noth-
ing more than a passing reference to the paid affiliation with the
school that permitted the placement of the banner. Also, while
license plates are required on all motor vehicles, schools are not
required to have banner ad programs, nor are businesses required
to advertise on school fences.257
Focusing heavily on the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of the mandatory inclusion
on banners of a thank-you message to sponsors—the “Partners in Excellence” lan-
guage—Mech’s petition contends that the appellate court decision “represents a stark
departure from the narrowly defined realm of government speech delineated in
Walker and permits the government to avoid any constitutional scrutiny of its actions
merely by affixing a meaningless affiliation to private speech and advertising.”258
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied Mech’s petition for a writ of certiorari
in October 2016.259 In doing so, the Court passed on a great opportunity to clarify,
if not roll back, the scope of Walker.
254 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 137 S. Ct. 73
(2016) (No. 15-1412) [hereinafter Mech Petition].
255 Kate Howard, Petition of the Day: Mech v. School Board of Palm Beach County,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2016, 11:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/petition-of
-the-day-951/ [https://perma.cc/K4XD-X6SC].
256 Mech Petition, supra note 254, at 8.
257 Id. at 8–9.
258 Id. at 11.
259 Mech, 137 S. Ct. 73.
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B. Welcome to Virginia! Riding the Highway to the Rest Stops of Government
Speech
In March 2016, United States District Judge Robert Doumar held in Vista-
Graphics, Inc. v. Virginia Department of Transportation260 that displays of informa-
tional and advertising materials for private businesses and other entities located in
highway welcome centers and rest stops owned by the Commonwealth of Virginia
“are government speech and not subject to First Amendment analysis[.]”261 In reaching
this result, the judge openly acknowledged that “[a] non-lawyer confronted with the re-
sulting displays would be unlikely to conclude that they were government speech.”262
This observation, of course, immediately casts doubt on the judge’s pro-govern-
ment speech determination, at least under the Walker majority’s consideration of
whom a reasonable observer—a non-lawyer—of the speech would consider to be
the speaker.263 Judge Doumar nonetheless found that “[t]he facts of this case fall
squarely within the doctrine as it has been expounded in recent Supreme Court
cases.”264 How did he reach this conclusion?
Judge Doumar began with a brief policy analysis. Citing Summum, he asserted
that the government speech doctrine stems “from a simple and uncontroversial premise:
when the government speaks it may say what it wants.”265 He found that the facts in
the case before him were controlled by “[t]he branch of the resulting evolutionary
tree” of the government speech doctrine developed in Summum and Walker, both of
which illustrate that government speech may “come in unexpected forms.”266
Turning to the three-part test for government speech allegedly created in these
cases, Judge Doumar wrote that the Court in Walker:
explicitly considered the same three factors it had identified in
Summum: (1) whether, historically, the government had used this
means of expression—license plates—to convey governmental
messages; (2) whether the public associated the means of expres-
sion with the government; and (3) whether the government exer-
cised editorial control over the messages conveyed.267
Judge Doumar’s assertion regarding the explicit consideration of “the same
three factors”268 in Summum and Walker, however, oversimplifies matters. First, it
260 171 F. Supp. 3d 457 (E.D. Va.), appeal filed, No. 16-1404 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016).
261 Id. at 461, 470.
262 Id. at 470.
263 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2247 (2015).
264 Vista-Graphics, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 470.
265 Id. (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009)).
266 Id. at 470–71.
267 Id. at 473 (citing Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2247–50).
268 Id.
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ignores the Summum Court’s clear consideration of the spatial-scarcity factor.269 As
Justice Alito wrote for the Court in Summum, “public parks can accommodate only
a limited number of permanent monuments”270 and therefore “it is hard to imagine
how a public park could be opened up for the installation of permanent monuments
by every person or group wishing to engage in that form of expression.”271 Justice
Alito reiterated the importance of this factor in penning the dissent for four Justices
in Walker, writing that “[a] final factor that was important in Summum was space.”272
The Walker majority, however, found the spatial-limitation issue, while important
in Summum, simply was not relevant in Walker.273 In brief, the Walker majority
omitted from its three-factor test a key factor in Summum.
Second, Judge Doumar’s articulation of the third factor—“whether the govern-
ment exercised editorial control over the messages conveyed”274—fails to recognize
the split between Alito’s emphasis on the level or degree of selectivity exercised by
the government—what he called “selective receptivity”275 in Walker—and the Walker
majority’s apparent focus on bottom-line, ultimate-arbiter control.276 As with the
Eleventh Circuit in Mech, of course, Judge Doumar was not bound to consider the
Walker dissent’s interpretation of control.
Regardless of the nuances lost in Judge Doumar’s assertion that Summum and
Walker applied the exact same factors, he reasoned that his “analysis of the present
controversy begins with the three factors laid out in Summum and Walker.”277 That
controversy centered on plaintiff Vista-Graphics, Inc., which publishes visitor
guides for some Virginia cities, such as Virginia Beach and Williamsburg, that list
local restaurants, hotels, and attractions and include advertisements.278 Importantly,
Vista-Graphics’s travel guides also feature political and religious materials.279
The company had distributed its guides freely280 for eight years at Virginia’s
highway welcome centers and rest areas,281 but filed suit after budget problems led
269 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 478.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 479.
272 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2261 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
273 Id. at 2249 (majority opinion)
274 Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 457, 473 (E.D. Va.)
(citing Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2247–50), appeal filed, No. 16-1404 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016).
275 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting).
276 See supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text (addressing this distinction).
277 Vista-Graphics, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 474.
278 Id. at 461.
279 Id. at 463.
280 See id. (“According to Plaintiffs, ‘[w]elcome centers and rest areas have traditionally
allowed business such as Vista-Graphics to distribute printed materials without charging for
this right, ostensibly because free speech protections afforded by the United States and Virginia
Constitutions.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
281 Id. at 461.
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to changes “requiring Vista-Graphics to pay fees to place materials” in these venues.282
Vista-Graphics claimed the fees were “unconstitutionally excessive.”283 It also ob-
jected to several related substantive changes in the program that it asserted violated
its First Amendment right to free speech, including provisions banning political and
religious advertising in the welcome centers and rest areas.284
As applied to Vista-Graphics’s facts, Judge Doumar wrote that the first factor—
history—“asks whether the Sta[t]e has used the displays in the Welcome Centers to
convey governmental messages.”285 He found it irrelevant that some information
distributed at these venues takes the form of private advertisements286 because
Virginia could “adopt these advertisements as its own speech just as in Summum
Pleasant Grove City adopted the donated monuments as its own.”287 The fact that
Virginia generated revenue from accepting this speech also did not change the
analysis for Doumar, who observed that the specialty plates deemed government
speech in Walker also produced money.288
Turning to whether speech displayed at welcome centers and rest areas is asso-
ciated in the public’s mind with the government, the judge observed the venues “are
attached to public roads, chiefly interstate highways, and are likewise connected in
the public mind with the state and federal governments that maintain such roads.”289
The fact that Virginia prohibits advertisers who use its displays from claiming that such
placement constitutes an endorsement by Virginia of their goods or services is irrele-
vant, Doumar reasoned.290 He intimated that it is the association with the state—not
an endorsement by the state—in the mind of the public that is key.291 This distinction—
association-versus-endorsement—seems slippery, but could be useful in future cases
if the explication of both concepts is elaborated in greater detail to explain the differ-
ence. It will be recalled from earlier that Justice Breyer speculated in Walker that
people may purchase specialty plates precisely because they intend “to convey to the
public that the State has endorsed that message.”292 The Eleventh Circuit in Mech
also suggests there might be a difference between association and endorsement.293
282 Id. at 462.
283 Id. at 464.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 474.
286 See id. (“It is of no consequence that one way that Virginia has disseminated this infor-





291 See id. (reasoning that for the Walker “majority it was enough that license plates were
associated with the State” (citing Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248–49 (2015))).
292 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249.
293 See cases cited supra notes 242–44.
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Finally, Judge Doumar turned to whether Virginia “exercises editorial control
over the content of the speech, in this case the Welcome Center displays.”294 He
found that Virginia, in fact, has “extensive requirements for what material may be
placed in the Welcome Centers”295 and that the state “retains final approval authority
over the advertisements or brochures placed in” these venues.296
Although all three factors militated for concluding the displays are government
speech297 and that the government message in question is the promotion of “the
many attractions that Virginia has to offer[,]”298 Judge Doumar criticized the third
factor as “frustratingly circular. Plaintiffs cannot challenge the government’s regu-
lation of the Welcome Center displays because the displays are government speech.
Why are they government speech? Because the government regulates them. Subtler
minds may quarrel with this analysis.”299
Judge Doumar thus went beyond analysis of the three factors to explain why it
is important to conclude that Virginia’s rest area displays of literature are govern-
ment speech and not, in contrast, public fora. Judge Doumar illustrated the rather
“perverse” fiscal effects that classifying rest-area displays as public fora might have
on a state’s interests.300 Specifically, if such venues were public fora in which a state
could not control viewpoints, then it would be forced to display speech adverse to
its economic interests.301 As Judge Doumar explained, if the rest-area displays were
public fora, then Virginia:
would be forced to allow advertisements that disparaged Virginia’s
many wonderful attractions. It would be forced to display adver-
tisements that suggested that Maryland and North Carolina were
more worthy travel destinations. Allowing such material would
undermine the entire purpose of the Welcome Center displays. The
government speech doctrine preserves the State’s ability to pro-
mote itself through means such as the Welcome Center displays.302
Judge Doumar’s approach here sensibly suggests that, in cases where the gov-
ernment claims it may censor speech of private entities as it pleases because the
venue should be treated as one for government speech rather than a public forum,
the government should carry the burden of proving why a public forum analysis is
294 Vista-Graphics, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 475.
295 Id. (internal citation omitted).
296 Id. at 462.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 476.
299 Id. at 475.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id. (citation omitted).
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inappropriate. In Vista-Graphics, that case is clear: Categorizing displays for bro-
chures and tourist guidebooks at state-owned rest areas as public fora would force
Virginia to either: a) accept speech that harms its own fiscal interests; or b) cause the
state to close and shutter all such displays for all brochures in order both to avoid
viewpoint-based discrimination and to not convey speech contrary to its financial
well being.
In other words, Virginia would face a Hobson’s choice of take it or leave it:
either to take and to display fiscal-harming speech or to leave the business of pro-
viding such displays entirely (i.e., to shut down all speech—both pro-Virginia and
anti-Virginia) at welcome centers and rest areas. Simply put, classifying brochure
displays at state-owned rest areas as public fora provides a strong financial disincen-
tive for states to engage in speech transmission.
In contrast to Vista-Graphics, the impracticality problem on the public forum
question in Summum was not fiscal but physical. Simply put, there would be too
little physical space in a public park to accommodate all of the permanent monu-
ments that private entities might want to donate.303 Eventually, a park would become
a veritable forest of densely clustered monuments if the government had to accept
them all, thereby crowding out room for many other forms of important expression
such as political marches, rallies, and speeches, as well as reducing space for even
more basic forms of freedom of association such as family picnics. As Justice Alito
explained for the Court in Summum:
A public park, over the years, can provide a soapbox for a very
large number of orators—often, for all who want to speak—but
it is hard to imagine how a public park could be opened up for
the installation of permanent monuments by every person or
group wishing to engage in that form of expression.304
In summary, here is what might happen under Judge Doumar’s suggested tack in
government speech cases of examining the negative consequences that would occur
if, instead of government speech, a public forum analysis was deemed appropriate:
Categorizing displays for tourist brochures in rest areas as public
fora in Vista-Graphics could harm Virginia’s own fiscal interests
(by being forced to display ads disparaging Virginia towns and
businesses, as well as ads promoting businesses in other, rival
states) and thus could provide Virginia with a strong incentive
for abolishing all such displays.
303 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (addressing the spatial limitations at
issue in Summum).
304 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 479 (2009).
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Categorizing government parks as traditional public fora when
it comes to the inclusion of permanent monuments in Summum
would pose vast physical space difficulties that, in turn, would
be detrimental to other forms of expression in those same parks
if permanent monuments were to proliferate unabated. And, as
with the brochure displays in Vista-Graphics, governments would
have a very strong incentive for shutting down public parks en-
tirely as venues for permanent monuments—a point Justice Alito
stressed in Summum.305
In brief, abolishing all displays for all tourist brochures at government-owned
rest areas and prohibiting all permanent monuments in public parks are potentially
realistic—and decidedly non-speech friendly—consequences in Vista-Graphics and
Summum, respectively, if a public forum analysis applies to those venues. Just as the
United States Supreme Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo306 recog-
nized that forcing newspapers to print viewpoints with which they disagree might
cause those papers to refrain from all commentary about political candidates,307 so
too does a public forum analysis in Vista-Graphics and Summum risk squelching all
speech of the specific varieties—namely, tourist brochures and donated permanent
monuments—at issue in those cases.
The question, of course, becomes this: What harms would befall Texas—or any
state, for that matter—if specialty license plates like those in Walker are categorized
as public fora in which viewpoint-based discrimination is not permissible? A strong
case can be made that neither the harm in Vista-Graphics nor that in Summum would
result from such a determination.
Initially, being compelled to offer a Confederate battle flag plate under a public
forum analysis is not akin, under Vista-Graphics, to being forced to offer speech that
305 As Justice Alito explained in Summum:
The obvious truth of the matter is that if public parks were considered
to be traditional public forums for the purpose of erecting privately
donated monuments, most parks would have little choice but to refuse
all such donations. And where the application of forum analysis would
lead almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum
analysis is out of place.
Id. at 480.
306 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
307 Id. at 257. As the Court wrote in Tornillo:
Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that
published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-
of-access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to
avoid controversy. Therefore, under the operation of the Florida statute,
political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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is directly counter to Texas’s fiscal interests by either disparaging the state’s own
businesses or promoting those of competing businesses in other states. If anything,
Texas should be able to generate even more money through the sale of specialty
license plates that express messages opposing the one that many people see as
symbolized by the Confederate battle flag.308 In other words, groups that believe the
Confederate battle flag symbolizes racism, bigotry, and hatred could propose their
own specialty plates featuring messages and images of tolerance, love, and racial
equality. Those groups should, in brief, engage in counterspeech,309 with Texas, in
turn, reaping the financial benefits that come when such counterspeech is situated
on specialty plates.
For instance, one can imagine a plate featuring the slogan “Texans for Racial
Equality” accompanied by the image of a peace sign or, perhaps more provocatively,
a Confederate battle flag overlaid with the international “no” sign (a red circle with
a line struck across it). Indeed, calling specialty license plates public fora would allow
for revenue-generating counterspeech on other topics, such as pro-choice views on
abortion in states like North Carolina.310
Seemingly, the only conceivable financial harm to Texas from calling specialty
plates a public forum would be indirect. One might imagine, for instance, a civil
rights organization calling on businesses not to locate in Texas because the state
allows license plates sporting the Confederate battle flag.311 Such financial injury,
308 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (describing the revenue generated in Texas
by specialty license plates).
309 As Justice Louis Brandeis explained ninety years ago, “[i]f there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay
Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy for “Bad” Speech, 2000 BYU
L. REV. 553 (discussing the counterspeech doctrine and providing examples of its use).
310 See supra Section II.A (addressing the battle in Tennyson over North Carolina’s specialty
license plate program offering a pro-life plate but rejecting several pro-choice alternatives).
311 The possibility of such a boycott is more than purely speculative. For instance, and by
way of analogy, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) refused for many
years to hold its annual basketball championship in South Carolina because the Confederate
battle flag flew on the state’s capitol grounds. Paul Kane & Abby Phillip, Battle Over Flag
Erupts in U.S. Capitol, WASH. POST, July 10, 2015, at A2. The NCAA ended its boycott in
2015 after South Carolina’s governor signed legislation ordering the flag to be removed. Id.
In addition to the NCAA, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) in July 1999 called for a boycott against South Carolina “as a protest of the flags
atop the State House and inside the House and Senate chambers. The NAACP called on
groups and individuals to avoid traveling to the state for business or pleasure and discouraged
residents from visiting South Carolina beaches or patronizing restaurants and motels.”
Roddie A. Burris, NAACP Takes Another Look at South Carolina Boycott, WASH. POST,
Oct. 22, 2006, at A10.
In 2015, Georgia legislator LaDawn Jones called for a boycott of Stone Mountain Park
in DeKalb County “to protest the fact that it still displays Confederate battle flags.” Richard
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were such a boycott to occur, stems from the offense taken by an organization (or
organizations) with Texas in permitting a hateful symbol to be displayed on spe-
cialty plates. In contrast, the potential financial injury to Virginia—addressed by
Judge Doumar in Vista-Graphics—has nothing to do with any group being offended
by Virginia permitting a hateful symbol to circulate in rest areas.
Additionally, the spatial-shortage justification for not categorizing privately
donated permanent monuments in public parks as public fora in Summum does not
apply in Walker. There is no danger in Walker that Confederate battle flag specialty
plates will somehow crowd out other forms of speech or other messages. As Justice
Alito wrote for the dissent in Walker, “[t]he only absolute limit on the number of
specialty plates that a State could issue is the number of registered vehicles. The
variety of available plates is limitless, too.”312 In contrast, both the non-speech
functions (baseball fields, playgrounds, picnic areas) and speech functions (rallies,
marches, concerts) of public parks would be impossible if those venues had to be
“opened up for the installation of permanent monuments by every person or group
wishing to engage in that form of expression.”313
The bottom line is that the only reason for not classifying specialty license plates
as a public forum is simply to prevent Texas from having to be associated with
speech that it (and some members of the public) finds offensive, be it the Confeder-
ate battle flag or other divisive symbols. If specialty plates are classified as public
fora and, in turn, Texas did not want to be associated with offensive messages,
Texas has the option of shutting down its entire specialty license plate program (akin
to Virginia having to close all displays for tourist literature at its rest areas or
Pleasant Grove City forbidding all privately donated permanent monuments in
Pioneer Park, but for a very different reason—not wanting to be associated with
something that offends).
That would be a very tough option for Texas to choose, given that its specialty
plate “program brings in many millions of dollars every year.”314 But by calling
specialty plates government speech, the Court in Walker gave Texas a pass on having
to make such choice. Indeed, Texas gets to keep its revenue stream and discriminate
against viewpoints in the process.
Fausset, A Plan to Honor Dr. King Among Confederates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2015, at A15.
Stone Mountain Park is owned by Georgia, and the park operates today, via Georgia statu-
tory authority, through an entity called the Stone Mountain Memorial Association, which acts
“for the proper development, management, preservation, and protection of Stone Mountain
as a Confederate Memorial and public recreation area.” What Is SMMA, STONE MOUNTAIN
MEMORIAL ASS’N, http://stonemountainpark.org/about-us/what-is-smma [https://perma.cc
/8MZH-VQGE].
312 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2261 (2015)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
313 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 479 (2009).
314 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2262 (citation omitted).
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C. Lunch Programs, Food Trucks, and Offensively Named Businesses:
Government Speech Grows More Confusing
Headquartered in Schenectady, New York, the provocatively named Wandering
Dago catering business touts itself as:
a full-service catering company that just happens to work out of
a food truck. Having a full commercial kitchen on board, allows
us to instantly transform any location into your wedding venue.
So whether your reception is going to be in a remote rustic barn, on
a private estate under a tent or in an urban warehouse—we can pro-
vide you and your guests with a unique culinary experience.315
The term “dago,” however, is an ethnic insult that “was generally applied in the
United States from the 1820s to Spaniards and Mexicans, but from the 1880s it was
used more [for] Italians.”316 As Geoffrey Hughes explains, “Italian immigrants to the
United States were initially viewed as aliens and outsiders,”317 and “dago” was one
of many derisive nicknames with which they were labeled.318
“Dago,” which former New York Governor Mario Cuomo once called, along
with the terms “wop” and “guinea,” one of “those cruel epithets” for Italians,319 can
still cause deep offense. It did so in 1989, for example, when a Florida judge used
the word in open court, provoking calls for an apology from the Italian-American
Club of Greater Clearwater.320 Clint Eastwood’s bigoted Walt Kowalski character
spouted the term in the 2009 movie Gran Torino.321 More recently, when the reality
television show Jersey Shore used the term “guido,” many Italian Americans ob-
jected to it as a modern-day version of slurs like “dago” and “wop.”322
But when Andrea Loguidice and Brandon Snooks, both of whom are Italian
Americans, decided around 2012 to name their food truck “Wandering Dago,” they
315 About Us, WANDERING DAGO, http://www.wanderingdago.com/about.html [https://
perma.cc/XKH2-9EH3].
316 GEOFFREY HUGHES, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SWEARING: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF
OATHS, PROFANITY, FOUL LANGUAGE, AND ETHNIC SLURS IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
WORLD 148 (2006).
317 Id. at 258.
318 Id. Other early offensive nicknames for Italians include “wop” and “guinea.” Id.
319 Mary McGrory, Cuomo’s Ethnic Challenge, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1990, at A2.
320 Thomas C. Tobin & Barbara Hijek, Italian-Americans Call for an Apology, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Dec. 13, 1991, at 3B.
321 Leonard Pitts, Eastwood, Sensitivity and ‘Gran Torino,’ CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W.
Va.), Jan. 8, 2009, at 4A.
322 Rebecca Nappi, Making the Most of the Situation Italian-Americans Say ‘Jersey Shore’
Stereotypes Are a Chance to Raise Awareness, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Feb. 21,
2010, at 1D.
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apparently did not foresee any problems.323 As Loguidice told a reporter for the New
York Times, “Our daily pay depends on what happens that day, so we just thought
it was a fun play on words. . . . We didn’t think it was derogatory in any manner. It’s
self-referential. Who would self-reference themselves in a derogatory manner?”324
Officials at the New York State Office of General Services (OGS), however,
thought “Wandering Dago” was anything but a fun play on words. Loguidice and
Snooks applied in 2013 for a permit to participate in an outdoor summer lunch pro-
gram held on the grounds of the state-owned Empire State Plaza (ESP) in Albany,
New York.325 In reviewing the application, OGS Executive Deputy Commissioner
Joseph Rabito “conducted a computer search of the term ‘dago,’ which not only
confirmed that it is an offensive derogatory term, but also revealed that it has been
used to refer to people of Spanish and Portuguese descent, as well as Italians.”326
The OGS thus denied the application on the grounds that “dago” was an offensive
ethnic slur327 and did not comport “with OGS’ policy of providing family-friendly
programming.”328 Somewhat remarkably, Wandering Dago was the only applicant
denied a permit to participate in the 2013 summer lunch program.329
History repeated itself in 2014, as Wandering Dago’s application for the sum-
mer’s lunch program was again denied due to the business’s name.330 The offending
moniker, in fact, was the sole basis for denial, given that Wandering Dago’s 2014
application otherwise “was scored and received a passing score sufficient for ac-
ceptance into the program.”331
Wandering Dago sued multiple officials within the New York State Office of
General Services in Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito,332 contending that the denial
of its application violated the First Amendment freedom of speech clause for at least
two reasons.333 First, Wandering Dago argued that the OGS failed to implement a
323 Thomas Kaplan, Barbecuers Ejected From Saratoga Over an Ethnic Slur on Their
Food Truck, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2013, at A18.
324 Id. (quoting Andrea Loguidice).
325 Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, No. 1:13-cv-1053, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046,
*7–13 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1), appeal filed sub nom. Wandering Dago Inc. v. N.Y. State Office
of Gen. Servs., No. 16-622 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2016).
326 Id. at *16 (citation omitted).
327 See id. at *18 (noting that “the name ‘Wandering Dago’ was the basis for the denial
of the application” and the assertion by the government defendants that Wandering Dago
“was the only applicant to the 2013 Summer Outdoor Lunch Program that had a name which
contained a derogatory ethnic or offensive term as part of its name” (citations omitted)).
328 Id. at *16 (citation omitted).
329 Id. at *17.
330 Id. at *22.
331 Id. (citation omitted).
332 No. 1:13-cv-1053, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1), appeal filed sub nom.
Wandering Dago Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Gen. Servs., No. 16-622 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2016).
333 Id. at *25–26.
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“clearly-articulated, consistently-enforced policy” regarding the permissible names
of food vendors and that the absence of precise rules, in turn, gave the OGS “unbri-
dled discretion” to restrict speech and posed “too great a danger of censorship[.]”334
Second, Wandering Dago argued that OGS’s rejection of its application amounted
to “unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.”335
In her March 2016 ruling in Wandering Dago, United States District Judge Mae
D’Agostino considered, sua sponte, the impact of Walker and the government
speech doctrine on Wandering Dago’s First Amendment claim.336 She initially
articulated the three-prong test from Walker by explaining that in Walker, the Court
concluded that specialty license plates were government speech “because (1) the
States have historically used license plates to communicate with the public, (2) license
plates are often closely identified in the public mind with the State, and (3) Texas
effectively controlled the expressive content of the license plates by exercising final
approval authority over submitted designs[.]”337 Judge D’Agostino ultimately con-
cluded “that all three factors identified in Walker are satisfied” in Wandering Dago,
thereby leaving the food truck’s owners remediless.338
Initially turning to the history factor as applied to the summer lunch program at
ESP, Judge D’Agostino noted that “the government has a history of sponsoring pro-
grams of all varieties. Implicit in that sponsorship is the fact that the government en-
dorses the message or messages conveyed.”339 She added that “the programs sponsored
and promoted by OGS have long conveyed messages to the people of the State[.]”340
This history analysis, however, ignores the fact that 2013 was the first time OGS
had run the summer lunch program on its own; in prior years, a single private entity
was in charge of supplying all food for the plaza.341 In other words, the judge focused
only on history at what might be considered the macro level—“the government has
a history of sponsoring programs of all varieties”342—rather than at the micro level
of the sponsorship of the specific lunch program at issue in the case. Thus, even a
brand new program—much like the relatively new banner program in Mech343—can
become a medium for government speech.
334 Id.
335 Id. at *26 (citation omitted).
336 Id. at *75. As the judge wrote, “[a]lthough the parties have not addressed the im-
plications of Walker on the present matter, the Court finds that a discussion of that case and
the government speech doctrine discussed therein is appropriate for the resolution of the
present matter.” Id.
337 Id. at *76 (citing Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239, 2249 (2015)).
338 Id. at *81.
339 Id. at *77.
340 Id. at *79.
341 See id. at *7.
342 Id. at *77 (emphasis added).
343 See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text (addressing the history factor in Mech).
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Turning to the second factor—who a member of the public would identify as the
speaker—she concluded “there is little chance that the observer will fail to see the
identity of the speaker”344 is OGS because “OGS informed the public about the
Program in several different ways.”345 Specifically, it promoted the lunch program
in email ads from its “sponsorship department,” on closed-circuit televisions through-
out the concourse of the plaza, and “on its Facebook page and other social media
websites.”346 In brief, the sponsorship of the program itself became a form of
government speech347 and the OGS, in turn, cannot be compelled to embrace
speech—within the ambit of that sponsorship—with which it disagrees.348 In brief,
the freedom granted to the government under the government speech doctrine, as
Judge D’Agostino put it, “also includes the choice to not speak.”349 Just as in
Walker, the government in Wandering Dago could not be compelled to express the
plaintiff’s message.350
Finally, turning to the control factor, the judge found that “the undisputed
evidence clearly demonstrates that OGS maintains tight control over any messages
that are sent during events it sponsors at the Empire State Plaza. OGS has long
history of only sponsoring programs that are ‘family friendly,’ and suitable to per-
sons of all ages.”351 Although not directly relating to the summer lunch program at
ESP, Judge D’Agostino pointed out that “during OGS sponsored events, OGS
employees have refused to hire performers because of the nature of their acts or
attire, removed a performer from the stage when he used the ‘N-word,’ and required
vendors to remove offensive and racially insensitive merchandise.”352 As with the
history factor, then, this analysis is at the macro level of control of content across
all OGS-sponsored events, not at the micro level of the ESP summer lunch program
challenged by Wandering Dago.
Additionally, it seems likely that the Walker dissent’s interpretation of control
may have tilted in favor of the food truck’s owners. Why? Because Justice Alito in
Walker concentrated on the amount or degree of selectivity exercised by the govern-
ment under the program at issue.353 In Wandering Dago, however, the degree of
selectivity appears very minimal, given that the Wandering Dago truck was the only
food vendor denied a permit for the ESP summer lunch program in 2013.354
344 Wandering Dago, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046, at *77.
345 Id. (citation omitted).
346 Id. at *78 (citation omitted).
347 Id. (“In sponsoring the Summer Outdoor Lunch Program, the State has engaged in a
form of speech[.]”).
348 See id.
349 Id. at *80.
350 See supra Section I.B.
351 Wandering Dago, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046, at *78–79.
352 Id. at *79 (citation omitted).
353 See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
354 See Wandering Dago, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046, at *17 (“Defendant Walters was
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That point was for naught, however, before Judge D’Agostino, who concluded
that the speech occurring as part of the OGS-sponsored summer lunch program at
ESP is government expression.355 The remedy for Loguidice and Snooks thus “lies
with the political process, not the courts”356 and not in the First Amendment protec-
tion of speech.
D. Rejecting the Government Speech Doctrine in Federal Trademark
Registration of a Disparaging Term
In December 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in In re Tam357 concluded “there is no government speech at issue in the rejection
of disparaging trademark registrations,” that would shield those rejections from First
Amendment scrutiny.358 The case, which was petitioned for and granted a writ of
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court in September 2016,359 centered on the
constitutionality of a provision of the Lanham Act that prohibits, in pertinent part,
the federal registration of a trademark that “may disparage” individuals and institu-
tions.360 The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) used this statutory
authority to reject the registration of “The Slants,” which is the name of an Asian
American dance band fronted by Simon Shiao Tam, because the term is disparaging
to individuals of Asian descent.361
Specifically, a PTO “examiner found that the mark likely referred to people of
Asian descent in a disparaging way, explaining that the term ‘slants’ had ‘a long history
of being used to deride and mock a physical feature’ of people of Asian descent.”362
Simon Tam countered that the band used the term as a cultural and political tool to
try to reclaim the meaning of the word.363
In turning back the government speech argument, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit reasoned that “[t]rademark registration is a regulatory
directed to advise all applicants, other than Wandering Dago, that they had been accepted
into the 2013 Summer Outdoor Lunch Program as vendors.” (citations omitted)).
355 Id. at *80–81.
356 Id. at *81 (citations omitted).
357 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
358 Id. at 1345.
359 Lee, 137 S. Ct. 30; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (No.
15-1293). The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case on January 18, 2017, but a
decision had not been reached when this Article went to press. See SUP. CT. U.S., https://
www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/15-1293.htm [https://perma.cc
/D6TY-YPEZ].
360 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2016), held unconstitutional by In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
361 Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331–32.
362 Id. at 1331 (citation omitted).
363 Id.
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activity. These manifestations of government registration do not convert the under-
lying speech to government speech.”364 In other words, there is a key distinction
between government conduct (the registration process) and government speech, with
the former at play in In re Tam. The only speech or message conveyed by registra-
tion of a trademark is simply “that a mark is registered.”365
The court illustrated the fallacy of the government’s argument by pointing out
that if trademark registration was to be considered government speech, then so too
would copyright registration be considered government speech.366 This, in turn,
would give the government the right to “prohibit the copyright registration of any
work deemed immoral, scandalous, or disparaging to others. This sort of censorship
is not consistent with the First Amendment or government speech jurisprudence.”367
Considering the Walker majority’s focus on who a reasonable observer would
believe is speaking, the court found that:
Trademarks are understood in society to identify the source of
the goods sold, and to the extent that they convey an expressive
message, that message is associated with the private party that sup-
plies the goods or services. Trademarks are not understood to con-
vey a government message or carry a government endorsement.368
Finally, the court rejected the argument that giving the right to federal trademark
holders to affix the “®” symbol next to their trademarks transforms those trademarks
into government speech.369 Once again reverting to a copyright analogy to demon-
strate the weakness of the government’s argument, the court noted that affixing the
“©” symbol “does not convert the copyrighted work into government speech or
permit the government to grant some copyrights and deny others on account of the
work’s message.”370
Ultimately, the court concluded that “[w]hen the government registers a trade-
mark, it regulates private speech. It does not speak for itself.”371
E. Summary
Of the four cases examined in Part III, three were determined to involve govern-
ment speech. In those cases, government speech took the form of: 1) banners,




368 Id. at 1347.
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Id. at 1348.
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identifying private businesses as school partners in exchange for cash donations, that
are hung from public school fences;372 2) brochures and advertisements developed
by private businesses for tourists and travelers that are distributed at state-owned
highway rest areas and welcome centers;373 and 3) the names of privately owned
food trucks that participate in a government-run summer lunch program held on
government property.374 The practical impact, in turn, of finding government speech
in this trio of cases was to allow: 1) a public school to censor banners because it
objected to the former occupation of a person—the man behind the message, as it
were;375 2) a state to censor tourist-targeted literature and advertisements because the
literature and advertisements might promote interests and views in conflict with
those of the state;376 and 3) a state to exclude a food truck from a government-
sponsored program because the state found the truck’s name offensive.377
Parsed even more simply, the government speech doctrine allowed the government
to target: 1) an offensive person (David Mech);378 2) offensive political and religious
viewpoints (Vista-Graphics’s materials with political and religious content);379 and
3) an ethnically offensive name (“Wandering Dago”).380 In contrast, another ethnically
offensive name—“The Slants”—was shielded from censorship because the govern-
ment’s registration of trademarks amounts to conduct rather than government speech.381
CONCLUSION
This Article examined early fallout from the United States Supreme Court’s
2015 ruling in Walker. Walker gave free rein to North Carolina to engage in flagrant,
viewpoint-based censorship—and the conservative fashion feared by Erwin
Chemerinsky382—in rejecting a pro-choice specialty license plate while simulta-
neously permitting a pro-life version.383 Walker also predictably allowed Virginia
372 See supra Section III.A.
373 See supra Section III.B.
374 See supra Section III.C.
375 See Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1073 (11th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016).
376 See Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 457, 462–63 (E.D.
Va.), appeal filed, No. 16-1404 (4th Cir. 2016).
377 See Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, No. 1:13-cv-1053, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046,
at *14–16 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1), appeal filed sub nom. Wandering Dago Inc. v. N.Y. State
Office of Gen. Servs., No. 16-622 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2016).
378 See generally Mech, 806 F.3d 1070.
379 See generally Vista-Graphics, 171 F. Supp. 3d 457.
380 See generally Wandering Dago, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046.
381 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam,
137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
382 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
383 See supra Section II.A.
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to snuff out Confederate battle flag imagery on its specialty plates that a pre-Walker
judicial ruling had forced it to accept.384
Furthermore, Walker gave the green light to the Eleventh Circuit to go beyond
discriminating against a message’s viewpoint and, perhaps more perniciously, to
target the person or entity behind the message, as Mech makes evident.385 Put more
bluntly, discrimination against both speech and speaker is enabled by the govern-
ment speech doctrine in a post-Walker world. David Mech’s past professional
life—in a perfectly legal occupation, but one that nonetheless tests cultural norms
on sexuality—stymied his ability to speak to potential customers of his tutoring
business in a venue (on school grounds via school fences) seemingly ideal for reach-
ing his target audience.386
Additionally, businesses with names that the government finds offensive, such
as “Wandering Dago,” can be easily excluded from government-run programs and,
in the process, deprived of a First Amendment opportunity to challenge such deci-
sions due to the government speech doctrine.387 The government becomes the arbiter
of all names that offend.
The government speech doctrine thus allows the government to break free from
the shackles of dicta in the Court’s 1971 ruling in Cohen v. California.388 In Cohen,
the majority opined that it is “often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.
Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled
distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so
largely to the individual.”389 The government speech doctrine, however, affords the
government power to make precisely those same ambiguity-laden decisions, free
from judicial review.
The government speech doctrine allows states like Virginia in Vista-Graphics
to squelch any and all political and religious messages, as well as other content
targeting tourists, in its highway rest areas and welcome centers.390 About the only
thing the government speech doctrine seemingly cannot do is to permit the govern-
ment magically to convert the “regulatory activity” of trademark registration into
government speech.391
384 See supra Section II.B.
385 See Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016).
386 Id.
387 See generally Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, No. 1:13-cv-1053, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26046 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1), appeal filed sub nom. Wandering Dago Inc. v. N.Y. State
Office of Gen. Servs., No. 16-622 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2016).
388 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
389 Id. at 25.
390 See supra Section III.B.
391 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam,
137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
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It is vital, however, to go beyond merely tallying up wins and losses. In particu-
lar, multiple lessons arise from Walker and the half-dozen subsequent lower-court
cases involving the government speech doctrine described in this Article. Because
these takeaways seem roughly comparable in significance, the order below does not
reflect their relative importance. With this in mind, here are seven lessons derived
from the cases addressed in this Article.
A. Difficult Cases May Be the Rule, Not the Exception
An initial lesson is that the epigraph opening this Article,392 drawn from the
Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Summum, is becoming a substantial understate-
ment. Justice Alito’s prediction that “[t]here may be situations in which it is difficult
to tell”393 if government or private speech is involved would seem, with the benefit
of hindsight, to be much better phrased as “there will be many situations in which
it is difficult to tell” if government or private speech is implicated. In fact, the
scenarios where it is hard to tell might prove to be the rule, not the exception.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit began Mech by asserting that “[t]his appeal
presents one of those situations” where “it is difficult to tell” if the government is
speaking or merely “providing a forum for private speech.”394 In the same vein,
United States District Judge Robert Doumar in Vista-Graphics ruefully remarked
that government speech may take “unexpected forms”395 and that it “must seem
strange” to non-lawyers that the expression in that case is government speech.396 He
elaborated that:
[t]he brochures and pamphlets in the displays are produced by
private groups who pay to place them in the Welcome Centers.
A non-lawyer confronted with the resulting displays would be
unlikely to conclude that they were government speech. How-
ever, the legal doctrine of government speech encompasses far
more speech than any natural usage of the phrase government
speech would suggest.397
Indeed, the term “government speech” is a misnomer. It is more akin to a term
of art. It will be recalled from earlier that Judge Doumar also felt compelled to go
392 See supra text accompanying note 1.
393 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009) (emphasis added).
394 Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1071 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016).
395 Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 457, 471 (E.D. Va.),
appeal filed, No. 16-1404 (4th Cir. 2016).
396 Id. at 470.
397 Id.
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beyond the mere application of factors from Walker and Summum and to explain
why it would be impractical, if not flat out wrong, to classify highway rest areas as
public fora for private expression.398
In Wandering Dago, Judge D’Agostino opined that she “does not believe that
the facts of this case fit cleanly within any of the existing First Amendment jurispru-
dence.”399 Because the facts did not jibe neatly within any one facet of First Amend-
ment law, D’Agostino felt compelled to analyze the case under three different
frameworks: a public forum analysis, a government employee/contractor analysis,
and the government speech doctrine.400 Her decision to take all three paths, rather
than choosing just one, is not surprising, given Professor George Wright’s observa-
tion that there is an “often murky and complex choice between classifying the
speech in question as government speech or as private party speech.”401
In a nutshell, three out of the four post-Walker, non–license plate cases exam-
ined here involved factual scenarios in which courts confessed that it was neither
intuitive nor easy to determine if the speech in question was that of the government
or whether the government speech doctrine provided the appropriate methodology
for analyzing the case. The true danger is that the government can take advantage
of this muddle and the proliferation of difficult cases by contending, in any given case,
that it has not created a limited public forum for private speech but, instead, is speak-
ing for itself in a forum it controls. The difference is pivotal because viewpoint-based
discrimination is not permitted in a limited public forum.402 In other words, ambiguity
provides an entrée for the government to argue that a government speech analysis,
rather than a public forum framework, is more appropriate. As far as slippery slopes
go then, the long-term danger is that increased usage of the government speech
doctrine threatens the continued viability of the limited public forum designation.403
B. History May Prove Irrelevant
Of the factors for distinguishing government speech from private expression,
history may be the most malleable and least helpful for plaintiffs in making their
398 See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text.
399 Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, No. 1:13-cv-1053, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046, at
*33 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1), appeal filed sub nom. Wandering Dago Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of
Gen. Servs., No. 16-622 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2016).
400 Id. at *33–34.
401 Wright, supra note 9, at 369.
402 See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (noting that “the
Court has permitted restrictions on access to a limited public forum, like the RSO program
here, with this key caveat: Any access barrier must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral”
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
403 See Inazu, supra note 33, at 1182 (contending that a “challenge to the modern public
forum anchored in the free speech right lies in the undertheorized realm of government
speech”).
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private-speech arguments. The Justices themselves fractured in Walker on the mean-
ing of history.
The Breyer majority focused on the history of license plates generally404 and
Texas’s general-issue405—not just specialty—plates to find this factor militated in
favor of government speech. To the extent the majority did focus on specialty plates,
it wrote only that speech on such plates “has appeared on Texas plates for decades.”406
In contrast, Alito’s dissent concentrated on the history of specialty plates in
Texas and pointed out that it was only “within the last [twenty] years or so” that
they were adopted.407 He added that “[t]he contrast between the history of public
monuments, which have been used to convey government messages for centuries,
and the Texas license plate program could not be starker.”408
In brief, there was disagreement in Walker on two aspects of history. First, the
Justices split on what constitutes a long history of the government speaking or, in
other words, how much time is sufficient or necessary for this factor to tip in favor
of the government. For the majority, two decades of Texas speaking through
specialty plates was sufficient,409 but the dissent found this time span was not nearly
sufficient.410 Second, the Walker Court divided on the artifacts courts should
examine in making this inquiry. Should they consider the history of: a) license
plates generally, including plates from states other than the one at issue in a case?;411
2) specialty plates generally, including those in other states?;412 or 3) Texas’s
specialty plates specifically?413
In Mech, the Eleventh Circuit made it clear that the lack of a long history does
not need to kill or destroy the case in favor of government speech.414 The banner
program in that case was less than a decade old415 and the appellate court found that
this “weigh[ed] in Mech’s favor.”416 Yet, this made no difference in the end because
404 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248
(2015) (“First, the history of license plates shows that, insofar as license plates have conveyed
more than state names and vehicle identification numbers, they long have communicated
messages from the States.” (citations omitted)).
405 See id. (“In 1936, the State’s general-issue plates featured the first slogan on Texas
license plates: the word ‘Centennial.’” (citation omitted)).
406 Id.
407 Id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting).
408 Id.
409 See id. at 2248 (majority opinion).
410 Id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting).
411 See id.
412 Id. at 2259–60.
413 Id. at 2260.
414 See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text (addressing the history analysis in Mech).
415 Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1075 (11th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016).
416 Id.
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the Eleventh Circuit held that the absence of a long history “is not decisive”417 and
“a long historical pedigree is not a prerequisite for government speech.”418 The
school board thus only had to prove two factors—endorsement419 and control420—
rather than all three in order to strip Mech of his First Amendment rights.
In Wandering Dago, the government had only operated the outdoor summer lunch
program at issue since 2013.421 Yet United States District Court Judge Mae D’Agostino
ignored this fact and focused, instead, much more broadly on government-run
programs as a whole: “As to the first Walker factor, the government has a history of
sponsoring programs of all varieties[,]” she reasoned.422 In brief, by focusing on
government-sponsored programs collectively rather than on the one at issue specifi-
cally, D’Agostino tilted a factor that seemed to militate for private speech in favor
of the government. This recalls the split in Walker described above regarding the
particular artifacts or programs to which courts should direct their attention when
evaluating history.423
In Vista-Graphics, Judge Doumar eliminated any requirement of a lengthy his-
tory when he wrote that the first factor of the government speech test simply “asks
whether the [State] has used the displays in the Welcome Centers to convey govern-
mental messages.”424 Importantly, this phrasing omits any reference to a time-length
requirement such as “has long used” or “has historically used.”425 Additionally,
Judge Doumar’s analysis of history is devoid of any mention of specific dates or
years of the program in question.426 He simply cited and quoted Vista-Graphics’s
complaint for the general, non-time-specific proposition that “Virginia’s welcome
centers and rest areas have existed for a variety of purposes, including dissemination
of information [and] promotion of tourism.”427
In brief, history is highly malleable and manipulable. Furthermore, even when
history weighs in favor of private speech, as it did in Mech, it may be for naught if
417 Id.
418 Id. at 1076.
419 Id. at 1076–78.
420 Id. at 1078–79.
421 See Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, No. 1:13-cv-1053, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046,
at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1) (“Although an outdoor lunch program had been operated in prior
years by Sodexo, a private company which had a contract to provide food services for the
Empire State Plaza, Sodexo’s contract was not renewed for 2013, and OGS decided to run
its own summer outdoor lunch program.” (citations omitted)), appeal filed sub nom. Wandering
Dago Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Gen. Servs., No. 16-622 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2016).
422 Id. at *77 (emphasis added).
423 See supra notes 405–13 and accompanying text.
424 Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 457, 474 (E.D. Va.)
(emphasis added), appeal filed, No. 16-1404 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016).
425 See id.
426 Id.
427 Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Plaintiff’s Complaint).
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the other two factors tilt for the government. Thus the government need not worry
about the history facet of Justice Breyer’s test from Walker, as long as it prevails on
the questions of who a reasonable observer believes is speaking and whether the
government controls the speech.
C. The Spatial Scarcity Analysis Goes Missing
In Summum, the Court considered a spatial-scarcity factor that weighed in favor
of classifying private monuments in public parks as government speech.428 In
Walker, the four-Justice dissent similarly addressed whether spatial scarcity would
justify classifying specialty plates as government speech.429 The Walker majority,
however, held that spatial scarcity was not relevant.430 Justice Breyer suggested for
the majority that spatial scarcity was a relevant factor only in cases involving re-
strictions affecting “traditional public forums for private speech” like parks.431
In the four non–license plate cases analyzed here, spatial scarcity did not play
any role in the courts’ analyses. The three factors considered by the Eleventh Circuit
in Mech, for instance, were “history, endorsement, and control.”432 Interestingly, a
spatial-scarcity analysis might have proved relevant in Mech—and might, in turn,
have tilted in favor of the school board. That is because there presumably is a finite
amount of wall and fence space from which banners for private entities could be
hung on school property.
In Vista-Graphics, the district court identified the three government speech fac-
tors as “(1) whether, historically, the government had used this means of expression—
license plates—to convey governmental messages; (2) whether the public associated
the means of expression with the government; and (3) whether the government
exercised editorial control over the messages conveyed.”433 A spatial-scarcity factor
was not present, despite the fact that such an analysis might have been relevant. In
particular, Virginia could have argued that there is a limited amount of space inside
highway rest areas that can be devoted to private literature targeting tourists. Other
space must be set aside for other things, such as bathrooms, vending machines,
drinking fountains, maps, and the usual accoutrements of rest areas.
In Wandering Dago, the three factors were history, who reasonable observers
would identify as the speaker, and whether the government exercises control over
428 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
429 See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
430 See supra note 113–15 and accompanying text.
431 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249–50 (2015).
432 Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1075 (11th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016).
433 Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 457, 473 (E.D. Va.),
appeal filed, No. 16-1404 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016).
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the messages.434 As in Mech and Vista-Graphics, spatial-scarcity could have played
a role in Wandering Dago because the plaza level of Empire State Plaza—the venue
where the lunch program occurs—is bounded by three streets and a bulkhead wall.435
In brief, there likely is not adequate space to accommodate all possible food trucks
while simultaneously leaving sufficient space for office workers and others to walk
through the plaza.
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re Tam
noted that Walker considered “the history of license plates,” whether the design of
Texas’s license plates would be “closely identified in the public mind with the
State[,]” and the aspects of license plates controlled by Texas.436 Spatial scarcity was
not evaluated in In re Tam. Of course, there is no spatial-scarcity problem in the
process of trademark registration; a seemingly infinite number of marks could be
registered if they satisfy the government’s regulations.
Ultimately then, despite Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Summum and his
protestations in dissent in Walker to the contrary, the spatial-scarcity consideration
has been read out of the government speech test by lower courts. Justice Breyer’s
pronouncement for the Walker majority that a shortage of physical space is only
relevant in cases like Summum involving traditional public fora, such as public
parks, is holding sway at the lower court level.
D. Speculating About What Reasonable Observers Perceive: Identification,
Association, or Endorsement?
This mind-game facet of the government speech test is fraught with trouble.
First, it requires courts to make guesses about how mythical reasonable observers
would interpret the speech in question and, in particular, who they would perceive
to be speaking—the government or a private individual. It is akin to the guessing
game played in Establishment Clause cases involving the question of government
endorsement of religion.437 None of the cases examined here offered any demonstra-
ble and objective proof of who observers actually believed was speaking. No
surveys, for instance, apparently were conducted of people who pass through
Empire State Plaza during the summer lunch program to get their views about who
they believe is speaking when they see food trucks on the plaza. Similarly, survey
434 Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, No. 1:13-cv-1053, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046, at
*76–81 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1), appeal filed sub nom. Wandering Dago Inc. v. N.Y. State Office
of Gen. Servs., No. 16-622 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2016).
435 Id. at *5.
436 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248),
cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
437 See generally B. Jessie Hill, Anatomy of the Reasonable Observer, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
1407 (2014) (providing a timely and comprehensive review of the reasonable observer
standard in religion cases).
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evidence of people who see banners hanging from the fences of Palm Beach County
schools played no role in Mech.
Compounding the guessing game is fluidity of the perception that ultimately
counts in this analysis. Is it whether people identify the government as the speaker?438
Or is it whether they associate or identify the government in connection to the mes-
sage, even if they do not identify the government as the speaker itself?439 Or, finally,
is it whether reasonable observers believe the government is actually endorsing the
message?440 In other words, there may be key differences between identifying the
government as the speaker, associating the government with the speech, and believ-
ing the government actually endorses the speech. This facet of the Walker govern-
ment speech test thus begs for clarification.
E. Bottom-Line Control versus Selective Receptivity
In analyzing the control factor, the difference between the Walker majority’s
focus on whether the government exercises bottom-line or ultimate control over
speech441 and the Walker dissent’s emphasis on “selective receptivity”442 appears to
be of great consequence. While the courts in Mech, Vista-Graphics, and Wandering
Dago all concluded that control militated in favor of government speech,443 a
selective receptivity approach might have resulted in the opposite conclusion.
Specifically, selective receptivity methodology would have forced the court:
1) in Mech to consider how many other banners—banners other than
David Mech’s—the school board had rejected relative to the total number
of banners accepted;
438 See Wandering Dago, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046, at *77 (examining whether “the
observer will fail to see the identity of the speaker” (emphasis added)).
439 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 2016)
(Wynn, J., dissenting) (identifying the second Walker factor as “whether there exists a
‘routine’ and ‘reasonable’ association between the speech at issue and the government”
(citing Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248–49)).
440 See Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1076 (11th Cir. 2015)
(identifying the second factor as whether “observers reasonably believe the government has
endorsed the message” (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016).
441 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251 (reasoning that Texas “exercises final authority over each
specialty license plate design. This authority militates against a determination that Texas has
created a public forum” (citations omitted)).
442 Id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting).
443 See Mech, 806 F.3d at 1078; Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 171 F. Supp.
3d 457, 475 (E.D. Va.), appeal filed, No. 16-1404 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016); Wandering Dago,
Inc. v. Destito, No. 1:13-cv-1053, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046, at *78 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1),
appeal filed sub nom. Wandering Dago Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Gen. Servs., No. 16-622
(2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2016).
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2) in Vista-Graphics to consider how many brochures had been rejected
and removed from or banned from rest areas relative to the total number
placed there without incident; and
3) in Wandering Dago to consider the number of applications for food
truck permits rejected compared with the total number of applications
accepted.
If, as it seems, David Mech was the only person denied a banner,444 and the
owners of the Wandering Dago truck were the only ones denied a permit,445 then this
suggests an abject lack of selective receptivity and, in the Walker dissent’s view,
would lead to the conclusion that government speech was not at stake.
It appears that the control factor will almost inevitably tilt toward a finding of
government speech in cases like Mech, Vista-Graphics, and Wandering Dago as
long as the governmental entity has established criteria for controlling aspects of the
speech and has ultimate power to reject or accept it. Drilling deeper, however, into
the degree of selectivity with which that control is exercised to actually reject speech
would make it much more difficult for the government to prevail on this factor.
F. Two Possible Paths Forward
Perhaps the most intriguing means of addressing problems with the government
speech doctrine after Walker arise in Tennyson and Vista-Graphics. Specifically,
Judge Wynn, writing in dissent in Tennyson, rejected the binary choice between
government speech and private speech and, instead, proposed a “mixed speech”
category involving “private speech components that prohibit viewpoint discrimina-
tion.”446 In Wynn’s tripartite approach embodying “private, government, or mixed”447
categories, a determination of mixed speech affords the expression in question First
Amendment protection. As Wynn put it, whenever “the speech is not just the govern-
ment’s,” then viewpoint-based discrimination is forbidden.448
Although this hybrid category certainly boasts what might be considered curb
appeal, as it offers courts an escape hatch from endorsing government-imposed,
viewpoint-based censorship, it presently remains murky.449 How many and which
particular private speech components must exist before a government program falls
into this mixed classification? Are some aspects of private speech to be weighted
444 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
445 See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
446 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183, 186 (4th Cir. 2016)
(Wynn, J., dissenting).
447 Id.
448 See id. at 187 (“And because the speech is not just the government’s, North Carolina’s
allowing a ‘Choose Life’ plate while rejecting a pro-choice plate constitutes viewpoint
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.”).
449 See supra notes 156–61 and accompanying text.
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more heavily than others? Judge Wynn intimates that the presence of any shred of
private speech might be enough, when he writes that if something is “not pure
government speech,” then viewpoint-based discrimination is prohibited.450 Clearly,
the metes and bounds of a hybrid category would need to be fleshed out in much
greater detail to make it both viable and predictable.
A second possible approach to remedying some of the confusion surrounding
the government speech doctrine is teed up in Judge Doumar’s opinion in Vista-
Graphics. It would entail requiring the government to not only satisfy a test for
government speech, but also to prove “why such speech should be immune from
First Amendment challenge.”451 As Doumar put it, the government must demonstrate
“the perverse consequences of applying First Amendment doctrine” to the speech
in question.452 In other words, this methodology entails more than applying some
three-part government speech test; it demands that the government prove why clas-
sifying the program or venue as a limited public forum is misguided. This Article
suggested earlier how such a requirement might be applied to Walker.453 Doumar’s
suggestion makes intuitive sense because it demands more from the government
before it can strip speech of all First Amendment protection.
G. Where You Live May Affect What You Can Say
A final lesson is that geography makes a difference.
Do you want, for example, to successfully create a specialty license plate that
promotes your liberal viewpoint on global warming—one, perhaps, emblazoned with
“Global Warming is Real: Go Green”? In that case, then you should be sure to live
in a state with a liberal-controlled legislature, that is headed by a liberal governor.
It is a state where you are more likely, under the government speech doctrine, to be
able to promote that liberal viewpoint on specialty plates, while also being able to
simultaneously deny global warming skeptics a counter-posed plate. That is a fair
lesson to be drawn from Walker and its specialty-plate progeny, Tennyson and
Holcomb, addressed in this Article.
What if you want to be able to promote your conservative viewpoint on a topic
such as taxes—one decorated, for instance, with the slogan “Lower Taxes for All”?
Then you should reside in a state with a conservative-dominated legislature and
headed by a conservative governor. What’s more, you can have your lower-taxes
license plate and stop an opposing one—perhaps, one featuring a tagline such as
“Tax the One Percent” or “Soak the Rich”—too, all courtesy of the government
speech doctrine. That also is a lesson from Walker and the specialty-plate cases that
follow in its footsteps.
450 Tennyson, 815 F.3d at 189 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
451 Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 457, 475 (E.D. Va.),
appeal filed, No. 16-1404 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016).
452 Id.
453 See supra notes 300–05 and accompanying text.
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The point is especially made clear in Tennyson, where North Carolina was
permitted to offer a specialty plate adorned with a conservative viewpoint about
abortion and to deny one with a liberal viewpoint.454 The flipside, of course, could
work just as easily in a state like California, where both the legislature and executive
branches currently are controlled by Democrats.455 Besides moving to another state,
the only remedy under the government speech doctrine for someone unfortunate
enough to live in a state controlled by political opponents, as the Supreme Court
made clear in Walker, is to vote those lawmakers out of office and to install ones
whose beliefs match their own.456
In brief, where you live can make a large difference under the government
speech doctrine in terms of the messages that can be expressed and censored. In
some ways, then, the situation is analogous to the regulation of sexually explicit ex-
pression under the United States Supreme Court’s 1973 ruling regarding obscenity
in Miller v. California.457 There, the Court held that whether expression is obscene,
and therefore not protected by the First Amendment,458 is based on local—not
national459—“contemporary community standards.”460 As the Court wrote in Miller,
454 See supra Section II.A.
455 See Judy Lin, Brown, Lawmakers Agree on $115.4 Billion Budget, FOX BUS. (June 16,
2015), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2015/06/16/brown-lawmakers-agree-on-1154
-billion-california-budget-boosting-social-welfare.html [https://perma.cc/9EXF-22KA] (noting
California’s “Democratic governor” and its “Democratic-controlled Legislature”).
456 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015)
(asserting that “it is the democratic electoral process that first and foremost provides a check
on government speech” (citing Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 235 (2000))).
457 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
458 Obscenity is one of the few categories of expression that is not protected by the First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
(writing that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press”);
see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion) (iden-
tifying nine categories of unprotected speech, including: 1) “advocacy intended, and likely,
to incite imminent lawless action;” 2) “obscenity;” 3) “defamation;” 4) “speech integral to
criminal conduct;” 5) “fighting words;” 6) “child pornography;” 7) “fraud;” 8) “true threats;”
and 9) “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to
prevent” (citations omitted)); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002)
(observing that “[t]he freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories
of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real
children” (citation omitted)).
459 See Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Obscenity Law as an Alternative
to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 34 (2004) (observing that
“Miller rejected national standards”); John S. Zanghi, “Community Standards” in Cyberspace,
21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 95, 101 (1995) (noting that under Miller, the content “must be judged
according to the accepted local community standard”).
460 The Court’s current three-part test for obscenity created in Miller asks the factfinder
to determine if the material in question: (1) “appeals to a prurient interest” in sex, when
“taken as a whole” and as judged by “contemporary community standards” from the perspective
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“[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as
requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct
found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”461 Thus, by holding that the com-
munity standard is not a nationwide one, but rather is governed by local standards,462
the Miller Court embraced a test which means that one state (in a conservative com-
munity) can much more easily censor speech that, in another state (one with more
liberal and relaxed standards regarding sexuality), would be fully protected by the
First Amendment.463
In other words, much as if you want to be able to legally watch sexually graphic
imagery in your home, you are better off living in some communities (liberal leaning
ones) rather than others (conservative ones), so too then you should pick a state for
residence in which the legislative and executive branch leadership comports with
your own political ideology if you want to be able to design or purchase a specialty
license plate that promotes your political viewpoint.
In summary, the cases from 2015 and 2016 analyzed in this Article highlight mul-
tiple lessons and pitfalls with the government speech doctrine in a post-Walker world.
It is, of course, still too early to tell how other courts will wrestle with the doctrine.
Perhaps the best course, however, is for the Supreme Court to soon hear another
government speech case and for all nine Justices to agree on a coherent test that does
more than just deliver an emotionally satisfying result in a single case. David Mech,
for instance, petitioned the Court to review his case,464 yet the Court denied it in
October 2016.465 At present, however, the government speech doctrine’s plasticity
provides the government with ample leeway to censor offensive expression and to
engage in viewpoint-based discrimination, both of which are verboten under tra-
ditional First Amendment principles.466
of the average person; (2) “is patently offensive,” as defined by state law; and (3) “lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
461 Id. at 32 (footnote omitted).
462 See id. at 30 (reasoning that “our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court
to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single
formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists[,]” and concluding, in turn, that
“[t]o require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national ‘com-
munity standard’ would be an exercise in futility” (emphasis added)).
463 See United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1981) (observing that
application of the Miller standard “may result in prosecutions of persons in a community to
which they have sent material which is obscene under that community’s standards though
the community from which it is sent would tolerate the same material” (citing United States
v. Blucher, 581 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1978))).
464 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
465 Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 137 S. Ct. 73 (2016).
466 Speech cannot be silenced by the government simply because it causes offense. See
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The hallmark of the protection of free speech
is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might
2017] THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IN WALKER’S WAKE 1299
Finally, it is worth recalling Justice Breyer’s understanding in Summum “that
the ‘government speech’ doctrine is a rule of thumb, not a rigid category.”467
Unfortunately, the amorphousness of the current doctrine after Walker—divergence
on how far back the history analysis must go, debate about what artifacts count
when examining history, speculation (if not outright guessing) by the judiciary about
what a mythical reasonable observer of speech might believe, and a disagreement
on whether bottom-line control or “selective receptivity”468 is more important—truly
resembles a general rule of thumb that lacks any precision and accuracy. A little bit
more rigidity and clarity, despite Justice Breyer’s propensity for flexible “rule[s] of
thumb,”469 might go a long way in clarifying what now amounts to—at least from
the standpoint of a free-speech advocate—a dangerous doctrine. At present, the
metaphorical thumb that is government speech now presses down heavily in favor
of censorship on the scales of justice that balance government interests with those
of free expression.
find distasteful or discomforting.” (citations omitted)); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414
(1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the govern-
ment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.” (citations omitted)). Furthermore, as noted earlier, viewpoint-
based discrimination is typically forbidden in First Amendment jurisprudence. See supra
notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
467 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 484 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring).
468 Id. at 471 (majority opinion).
469 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In
my view, the category ‘content discrimination’ is better considered in many contexts, in-
cluding here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading
to almost certain legal condemnation.” (emphasis added)).
